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ABSTRACT 
 
What factors drive an individual to trust, or not trust, their government? Over the 
past two decades, an extensive literature has developed that seeks to identify the sources 
and determinants of institutional trust in East and Southeast Asia. While this literature has 
solidified around several factors, for example, positive evaluations of economic 
performance or anti-corruption efforts, there is still significant debate on the importance 
of others. This study seeks to contribute to this ongoing debate by testing the role of 
traditionalism or traditional social values and partisanship. Utilizing data on 13 countries 
from Wave 4 of the Asian Barometer Survey and controlling for a range of commonly 
identified determinants of institutional trust, this study uses regression analysis to test to 
what extent traditional social values and partisanship shape individual-level institutional 
trust, both at the regional, aggregate level as well as on a country by country basis. While 
traditional social values quite consistently display a positive, significant relationship with 
institutional trust, the role of partisanship is less consistent, varying from country to 
country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 To what extent does an individual trust his or her government? What factors, if 
any, shape that level of trust? Are these levels of trust consistent across all governmental 
institutions and actors, or do they vary? On the surface, these types of questions tap into a 
relatively simple concept - why and to what extent individuals trust their government. 
However, even a cursory glance at the academic literature on these topics, a literature 
concerned with investigating the determinants and impacts of what is commonly termed 
political or institutional trust, reveals an incredibly complex and still-contentious field of 
study.  
Why should we care about institutional trust? The reasons are many and varied. 
To take just a few examples, while Grönlund and Setälä (2007) acknowledge the mixed 
results found in the literature on the topic, using survey data from the 2002-2003 
European Social Survey, they find that, even when controlling for a wide variety of 
demographic and attitudinal variables, trust in parliament exerts a significant, positive 
influence on voter turnout at the regional level, and this relationship holds for eleven of 
the twenty countries included in the survey. While it is certainly possible to debate the 
normative aspect of whether increased levels of turnout are good or bad, this is an 
important outcome of institutional trust regardless.  
Looking at the impact of institutional trust from a different direction, Evers and 
Gesthuizen (2011) investigate what impact institutional trust has on donation behavior, 
and they find that higher levels of individual-level institutional trust lead to increased 
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levels of donations to what they term “activist” and “leisure” organizations, and higher 
aggregate levels of individual trust at the country level, indicative of greater general faith 
in the institutions in those countries, leads to significantly lower levels of donations. 
Intriguingly, Hudson (2006), looking at EU data, makes the case that, when controlling 
for a host of other factors, trust in several international institutions as well national 
government, coded as a binary 0 or 1, has a significant and positive impact on levels of 
happiness. While no means comprehensive, the impressive breadth of topics that these 
studies cover, ranging from voter behavior to individual happiness, emphasizes the many 
consequences of higher institutional trust. The practical importance of these effects 
suggests a fuller understanding of both the determinants and implications of institutional 
trust is warranted. It is on the former, the determinants of institutional trust, that I focus 
this analysis.  
 In this work, I seek to contribute to this growing literature, specifically as it 
relates to institutional trust in East and Southeast Asia, through the lenses of a few key 
questions. One, for countries in East and Southeast Asia, what influences individual-level 
trust in government? Two, are there certain approaches that more effectively explain 
levels of individual-level institutional trust? And three, are there any broad 
generalizations that can be made about institutional trust in East and Southeast Asia, or 
do the explanations about institutional trust vary from country to country? While I choose 
to focus more heavily on the determinants of institutional trust rather than the outcomes 
of institutional trust, this study joins a growing number of works looking at both aspects 
across the globe. As Marien and Hooghe (2011) note, “In recent years, the topic [political 
or institutional trust] has attracted renewed attention in the scholarly literature as a 
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reaction to various studies documenting a structural decline in levels of political trust – 
most notably in the United States,” (pg. 267). Moreover, this study seeks to contribute to 
a growing regional literature on institutional trust, what Park (2017) identifies as the 
study of institutional trust in the Asia-Pacific.  
 Park’s work also offers a few reasons as to why further attention deserves to be 
paid to the study of institutional trust in the Asia-Pacific more broadly and East and 
Southeast Asia in particular. In brief, the region is one, “… of greater cultural and 
religious diversity…” and, “… varies widely by the type of regime and mode of 
governance,” (Park 2017, pg. 488). While areas like Western Europe have some 
diversity, the greater regional diversity of East and Southeast Asia permits studies of 
institutional trust to account for a wider variety of factors. For one example, Shi (2001) 
was able to use the shared cultural background but wildly different regime types present 
in Taiwan and China to isolate the impact of cultural factors and regime types on 
institutional trust, something that would not have been possible in a region of well-
established democracies.   
Additionally, the trends in overall levels of institutional trust that Marien and 
Hooghe (2011) discuss are not as easily apparent in East and Southeast Asia. Looking at 
data points from 17 different countries in the Asia-Pacific between 1996 and 2011, Park 
(2017) identifies four different patterns of fluctuations in institutional trust, only two of 
which appear to be trending downwards. If even the general trends of institutional trust in 
the region do not fully mirror the global experience, it is especially important for further 
studies to test whether commonly accepted determinants of institutional trust hold up to 
scrutiny when tested in East and Southeast Asia. While this question will be more fully 
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explored in the literature review, one example of cause for such concern can be found in 
a study by Kim (2005), who calls into question the relationship between institutional trust 
and social capital in South Korea, a relationship put forward and tested in Western 
countries by scholars like Putnam. These types of studies should make us hesitant to 
blindly accept that such relationships are easily transferable from region to region.  
 In the following sections, I utilize data from Wave 4 of the Asian Barometer 
Survey1, covering 14 countries in East and Southeast Asia and conducted between 2014 
and 2016, to investigate several potential determinants of institutional trust. I place 
particular emphasis on the roles of traditional social values and partisanship, variables 
that to date have received comparatively little attention in the wider literature. In the 
literature review, I elaborate on two broad approaches to explaining levels of institutional 
trust while also documenting and exploring the impacts of methodological 
inconsistencies in the literature on what conclusions can be drawn about institutional trust 
in the region. Additionally, it is from this analysis that I derive two hypotheses and 
identify several variables that need to be tested in the later quantitative sections. 
Following this review of the literature, I include two quantitative chapters, each 
consisting of a section detailing the data and methods used and a section detailing the 
results of the analysis. While both chapters contain an array of independent variables, the 
first chapter specifically investigates the relationship between traditional social values 
and institutional trust while the second chapter focuses on partisanship. After this 
 
1 Data analyzed in this paper were collected by the Asian Barometer Project (2013-2016), which was co-
directed by Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received major funding support from Taiwan’s 
Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project 
Office (www.asianbarometer.org) is solely responsible for the data distribution. I appreciate the assistance 
in providing data by the institutes and individuals aforementioned. The views expressed herein are my own. 
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analysis is complete, I conclude the paper with a reflection on the broad implications of 
the results of the analysis and potential avenues for future research.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 An analysis of the literature surrounding individual-level institutional trust in East 
and Southeast Asia reveals a substantial amount of internal debate. In this literature 
review, I provide an overview of two of the major debates observable in the literature. 
The first is somewhat more explicitly methodological in nature. When discussing 
individual-level trust in government, which parts of government and other institutions are 
being referred to? I argue that the literature takes two broad approaches to this topic, and, 
importantly, an analysis of these two approaches suggests that this methodological 
distinction appears to have meaningful implications for analysis on what factors influence 
institutional trust. Second, I provide an overview of the main debate in the literature, that 
being which factors are the key determinants of individuals’ trust in government. This 
section includes not only a listing of competing explanations but also attempts to assess 
the extent to which the current literature supports said explanations, and in which areas 
the literature could be improved or further developed.  
Methodological Distinctions 
 Beginning with the first debate, a review of the relevant literature produces two 
relatively clear trends in terms of which institutions authors utilize to test determinants of 
individual-level trust in government. First, a portion of the literature largely limits its 
analysis to a subset of institutions. For example, Kim (2005), in a study that looks at 
political trust in South Korea, limits his analysis to parliament and political parties. Wang 
(2013) utilizes two different sets of institutions when measuring political trust in China, 
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South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, first looking at the presidency or prime minister as well 
as the national government and then later looking at trust in the central and the local 
government levels. Similarly, Park (2017) limits his regression analysis of institutional 
trust to an indexed score utilizing responses to questions about trust in the national 
government and parliament. What is particularly worth noting is that both Wang (2013) 
and Park (2017) utilize various waves of Asian Barometer data, which offers trust data on 
a large suite of institutions ranging from the national government, to courts, to the police, 
to the armed forces, to the media, and Park (2017) even includes much of this data in a 
descriptive discussion of trends in trust in East Asia before focusing in only two 
categories to conduct further analysis.  
By contrast, another subset of the literature employs a much more broad-based 
approach to the topic. For example, Zhai (2016), in his analysis of institutional trust in 
China, not only includes a greater list of institutions by looking at parliament, political 
parties, the national government, and courts, but he also includes trust in governmental 
officials as another avenue of analysis, while Tang (2011) extends this further, adding the 
presidency, the civil service, the military, the police, and local government to his models. 
In summary, at the methodological level, there is broad variance from study to study as to 
which institutions are considered when attempting to statistically test the determinants of 
political trust, and these differences persist despite the availability of data concerning 
much a more expansive set of institutions.  
 Justifications as to why some studies select a small battery of institutions while 
others work with a much more holistic one vary. One justification for the selection of 
parliament and political parties as the only institutions simply asserts that trust in 
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parliament is the best measure available because parliament is preeminent in a 
representative system (Kim 2005). Sometimes the explanations are not fully developed. 
For example, the extent to which Park (2017) discusses why an index of only trust in 
national government and parliament is used to conducted regression analysis is limited to 
a brief statement that they are the, “… political branches of government,” (pg. 501). 
However, there are studies that limit their selection of institutions while more fully 
developing their reasoning. Chi and Kwon (2016), when looking at the impact of 
perceived inequality on trust in Taiwan and South Korea borrow from Mishler and Rose 
(2001) and Chang and Chu (2006), limiting themselves to a list of six institutions. Chang 
and Chu (2006) themselves, when looking at the relationship between corruption and 
political trust in East Asia, borrow the framework from Mishler and Rose (2001). Mishler 
and Rose (2001), in a study of trust of 10 post-Communist countries in Eurasia, base their 
decision to limit themselves to six institutions (parliament, the prime minister/president, 
courts, police, political parties, and the military) out of an original list of 11 due to 
analysis that found those institutions accounted for the lion’s share of variance in trust, 
and they additionally note that repeating their analysis with all 11 institutions results in 
no meaningful change in results. While it would have been potentially worthwhile to see 
either Chang and Chu (2006) or Chi and Kwon (2016) repeat the analysis that led to such 
a decision to limit the range of institutions with new data sets in a new region, but the 
logic used to arrive at this decision is easy to follow.  
 Importantly, the literature suggests that differences in which institutions are 
included in the analysis have an impact on the results. One way in which this materializes 
can be seen in the work of Tang and Huhe (2016), who find that decentralization has a 
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statistically significant impact on political trust, but the direction of this relationship is 
different depending on whether local or national trust is being measured and whether the 
regime is authoritarian or democratic. In particular, in authoritarian regimes 
decentralization has a negative impact on local trust and a positive impact on national 
trust, whereas decentralization leads to a significant, positive increase in local trust in 
democracies and loses significance at the national level (Tang and Huhe 2016). 
Disregarding for the moment the differences based on regime type, just the differences in 
the way that decentralization influences trust when looking at local government versus 
national government suggests a greater need to carefully consider what institutions 
researchers choose to study in future research. 
 A study by Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) also highlights potential consequences of 
only using a small battery of institutions in measurements of trust, as they find that 
partisanship does not equally impact trust in all institutions. Instead, they find that trust in 
what they term “partisan institutions” like the president or prime minister and parliament 
is more strongly impacted by partisanship than in “neutral institutions” like the civil 
service and the military. While Park (2017) measures whether respondents voted for the 
winner or loser the last election, and Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) measure partisanship 
explicitly as identification with the party in power or with opposition parties, Park 
concludes that the partisan bias quantified by this winner/loser split does not have an 
impact in Mongolia for political trust measured with two institutions, whereas Huang, 
Lee, and Lin find a significant relationship between partisanship and trust in Mongolia 
for a subset of the institutions they measure. While some of this difference may be in how 
partisanship is being measured, the design of Park’s study prevents this question from 
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being answered by not considering a wider variety of institutions. Finally, Yang and Tang 
(2010) look at a set of 13 political institutions in China and utilize factor analysis to 
divide them into administrative, legal, and societal categories, and they find that a variety 
of potential determinants of individual trust in institutions have different effects 
depending on the category of institution under discussion. Altogether, the findings in 
these studies and the different conclusion reached by Park and Huang, Lee, and Lin’s 
reinforce the notion that there are differences in the determinants of political trust across 
a wide range of institutions, and a failure to include a wider range of institutions when 
testing institutional trust has the potential to generate conclusions that do not accurately 
reflect the full complexity of the factors that impact institutional trust in East and 
Southeast Asia.  
Debates on the Determinants of Institutional Trust 
 The second major debate in the literature centers around which factors best 
explain individual-level institutional trust in East and Southeast Asia. While there are 
various ways one might categorize potential determinants, this paper utilizes a framework 
put forward by a number of studies (e.g. Wong, Wan, and Hsiao 2011; Tang 2011; Zhai 
2016; Wang 2013; Yang and Tang 2010; Mishler and Rose 2001; Ma and Yang 2014), 
dividing approaches into two large categories: institutional approaches and cultural 
approaches. To elaborate more, Wong, Wan, and Hsiao (2011) borrow from Mishler and 
Rose (2001) in splitting up the relevant literature between institutional and cultural 
approaches, and in their review of the relevant literature they argue that the institutional 
approach centers around rational evaluations of the performance of government. When 
testing the institutional approach, the authors measure such a rational evaluation via 
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economic performance, as represented by handling of the economy and unemployment, 
and political performance, as represented by views governmental handling of political 
corruption and human rights issues. There appears to be in the literature a broad-based 
agreement on at least some of the factors that fall under the institutional approach, as 
numerous studies (e.g. Tang 2011; Huang, Lee, and Lin 2013; Wang 2013; Shi 2001) 
incorporate measures designed to capture economic performance and/or issues with 
corruption.   
However, this is not the only way in which studies have attempted to measure 
evaluations of governmental performance. Mujani and Liddle (2013) utilize an index 
consisting of responses to five questions such as satisfaction with the current government, 
likeliness of the government to solve what respondents viewed as a serious problem, ease 
of access to services like help from the police, and so on, focusing on these types of 
issues in addition to questions regarding economic performance rather than topics like 
corruption. Park (2017) also employs a slightly different approach, creating categories of 
policy performance, including economic performance, security, and anti-poverty efforts, 
and process performance, measured by a sub-set of topics related to rule of law. The 
benefit of this type of approach is that it allows for analysis to tease out further details 
about which factors shape individual-level trust institutional trust and to control for 
potential competing explanations. For example, returning to the topic of economic 
performance as a determinant of trust, Park (2017) finds that views on the national 
economy are much better predictors of political trust in East Asia than perceptions of the 
respondent’s own economic situation. These varying approaches showcase that, even 
with a general agreement in the literature on these important aspects of the institutional 
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approach, the constituent methods used to measure such performance can vary to some 
extent from study to study. And, small variations in the methods used can help contribute 
to a greater overall understanding of the institutional factors that shape institutional trust.   
Moreover, there are several potential determinants analyzed in the literature that 
might not fit entirely with the definition of institutional trust provided by Wong, Wan, 
and Hsiao (2011), but might fit under an expanded definition. First, both Park (2017) and 
Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) incorporate media exposure as a potential determinant of 
trust, something seen as a significant, negative determinant of trust in portions of the 
African literature (Hutchison 2011; Hutchison and Johnson 2011), and Huang, Lee, and 
Lin explicitly include it in an evaluation of governmental performance while Park lists it 
as an alternative explanation. However, the findings of these two papers provide slightly 
different results. Both Park (2017) and Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) utilize Asian 
Barometer Survey data to measure the impact of media exposure, although Park utilizes a 
combination of waves 1, 2, and 3 of the ABS as available and Huang, Lee, and Lin limit 
their analysis to the wave 3 data. Both studies use different sets of additional variables as 
controls and independent variables, and the question used within these surveys simply 
asks how often respondents view news about government or politics.  
Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013), when looking at Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, find that only in Korea is there a significant, 
negative impact of media consumption on institutional trust that persists in a generalized 
analysis of institutional trust as well as when controlling for partisan versus neutral 
institutions, although in the Philippines there is a significant, positive influence on trust in 
neutral institutions. Park (2017), in a battery of ten countries, including all six countries 
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tested by the aforementioned paper, measures trust only in national government and 
parliament, and finds a significant effect for media exposure in the Philippines and 
Cambodia. It is difficult to ascertain what, exactly, is driving this difference in findings. It 
may be that the limited range of institutions that make up the trust measure in Park’s 
paper leads to differing conclusions, but in the Asian context media exposure appears to 
be a comparatively unreliable determinant of institutional trust as it is only significant in 
a small number of countries.  
However, it is worth noting that there are potential concerns about using such a 
simple measure of media exposure. For example, Ceron (2015) utilizes data from 27 
countries in the Eurobarometer survey dataset to investigate the impact on institutional 
trust, indexed as trust in the national government, regional and local governments, 
parliament, and political parties, of exposure to different types of news media, 
particularly government and traditional media websites versus social media. Ceron 
(2015) finds that higher rates of social media news consumption decrease trust, while 
such consumption from governmental and traditional media websites actually increases 
trust. Moreover, in testing the impact on trust of news consumption from non-web-based 
sources, press and radio news consumption significantly increased trust, while TV news 
had no effect (Ceron 2015).  
Applying these findings to the East and Southeast Asian context, then, it raises the 
potential that either the data available through the Asian Barometer Survey is simply not 
detailed enough to accurately test more nuanced relationships or that the analyses 
themselves are not nuanced enough. Luckily, a study by Wu (2014) looking at trust of the 
courts and police in China and Taiwan utilizes second wave ABS data to measure the 
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impact of varying forms of media consumption and highlights that it is possible to control 
for the amount of Internet use among respondents as well as whether they utilize 
television or newspapers as their primary source of information.  The results are again 
somewhat inconclusive, with the only significant relationship between types of media 
consumption and trust in the police/courts being that in China those who consumed 
foreign news were less likely to trust these two institutions (Wu 2014). But the 
methodology utilized in the study suggests that it is possible to in more detail analyze the 
impact of media exposure on various institutions in the region with available data. And, it 
would be of benefit to the literature to do so, if only to more firmly demonstrate the 
inconsistent relationship between media exposure and institutional trust.  
Similarly, there is some discussion in the relevant literature on the role of 
government type and electoral systems. Tang and Huhe (2016) find that whether a 
country is a democracy or autocracy, measured either on a dichotomous scale or via 
Polity’s index, has an important interaction effect when it comes to measuring the impact 
of decentralization on political trust. This suggests that the generalized type of 
government a country operates under, while not directly impacting individual trust, may 
still need to be incorporated into models to control for any potential interactions with 
other variables. Focusing on a slightly different area, Park (2017) notes differences in the 
influence of winning or losing the last election on trust in both competitive authoritarian 
and electoral systems, arguing that electoral systems that disproportionately create losers 
have a larger influence on changes in institutional trust.  
Unfortunately, there appears to be comparatively little literature focused on East 
and Southeast Asia that explicitly analyzes the differences between different electoral 
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systems or electoral outcomes, although literature from outside the region suggests some 
ways in which the topic might be approached. For example, Cho (2012) conducts a study 
of 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, seeking to test to what extent differences in 
electoral systems, particularly majoritarian versus proportional representation systems, 
influence political trust in the legislatures of those countries. Conducting a multi-level 
analysis and controlling for factors including election quality, economic conditions, 
winner/loser divide, demographic variables, and so on, feelings of accountability towards 
legislators had no significant impact on trust whereas feelings of representation had a 
significant, positive impact on trust (Cho 2012). Accountability played no greater role in 
majoritarian systems than PR systems, and PR systems were significantly more able to 
translate feelings of representation into trust as compared to majoritarian systems (Cho 
2012). At a minimum, these findings suggest that in some regions differences in electoral 
systems have a wider sphere of influence than only the relationship between the 
winner/loser divide and institutional trust, and it would benefit the East and Southeast 
Asian literature to pursue this direction moving forward.  
Looking at the topic from a different angle, Marien (2011) utilizes data from 
Europe and focuses not on the type of electoral system being utilized by a country but 
instead the impact of overall proportionality of the outcomes on political trust in 
parliament, politicians, and political parties. Controlling, for various demographic 
variables, institutional performance, the winner/loser divide, good governance, the age of 
the regime, and GDP per capita, Marien (2011) finds a curvilinear relationship between 
institutional trust and proportionality; very proportional and very disproportional election 
outcomes both lead to significant, positive increases in trust, which she suggests would 
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explain why previous empirical analyses have, when attempting to model this 
relationship linearly, found contradictory results on the impact of proportionality on 
political trust. Again, however, a review of the East and Southeast Asian literature on 
trust did not turn up studies that have attempted to apply this process to the region, which 
suggests yet another way forward that could help expand on the impact of electoral 
systems on political trust in the region. Altogether, although the role of electoral systems 
may be a factor that does not explicitly fall under a restrictive definition of the 
institutional approach, it seems reasonable to include it under a discussion of the 
institutional approach expanded to incorporate the impact of the structural design of 
governmental systems.  
Returning to the other half of this debate, Wong, Wan, and Hsiao (2011) define 
the cultural approach to understanding institutional trust as one that acknowledges the 
impact of unique cultural backgrounds, noting that these backgrounds can influence the 
way in which people might otherwise rationally evaluate the performance of their 
government. One commonly tested method that the literature suggests may explain the 
way in which the cultural background of a person might influence trust is Putnam’s social 
capital theory, which several studies (e.g. Kim 2005; Wang 2013; Huang, Lee, and Lin 
2013) break down into social trust and civic engagement. On this topic, Huang, Lee, and 
Lin (2013) conclude that social trust is a better explanatory variable than civic 
engagement when controlling for other factors such as economic performance and 
partisanship. Perhaps due to similar sentiments among other researchers, social trust has 
also found application in several studies separate from civic engagement (e.g. Mujani and 
Liddle 2013; Tang 2011; Park 2017) but there appears to be significant variation between 
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studies that incorporate social trust, or even both social trust and civic engagement, as to 
whether it is a significant determinant of individual institutional trust in all cases.  
To look further into this variation, it is helpful to focus on several studies with 
differing results. Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013), Park (2017), and Wang (2013) all 
operationalize social trust in the same way, utilizing a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether respondents feel that other people can, generally, be trusted, but each study uses 
different controls, different countries, different institutions that make up its institutional 
trust measure, and different combinations of waves of the Asian Barometer Survey data. 
And, potentially due to these differences, the conclusions that these three studies draw 
experience noticeable variation. Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) find that social trust is a 
significant, positive determinant of institutional trust for at least one subset of institutions 
they analyze, with institutions being grouped into partisan and neutral categories in 
addition to a general trust score, in all six countries - Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, 
Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia - they study. Park (2017) adds an additional four 
countries, for example, Japan, to those used in Huang, Lee, and Lin’s study, and he finds 
that for only three countries of the 10 studied – South Korea, Mongolia, and Indonesia - 
does social trust have a significant impact on institutional trust, and it is positive in each 
case. While there is some agreement here, then, the two studies find diverging 
conclusions on Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand. Finally, Wang (2013) finds that 
social trust has a significant, positive impact on institutional trust in an aggregate data set 
from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, but upon disaggregating this data down to the 
country level the relationship remains only in South Korea. What these disparate results 
suggest is that, even when a variable like social trust is being operationalized in the same 
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way, studies manage to find contradictory results that call into question which finding is 
correct.  
Moreover, due to the lack of a consensus as to which index to use for institutional 
trust, which controls to incorporate in an analysis, and which years of survey data to 
include, there is no immediately available way such comparisons might be made. This 
issue is further compounded by the fact that Mujani and Liddle (2013) operationalize 
social trust differently, creating an index from responses to five questions rather than 
relying on a single dichotomous variable, and conclude that social trust has a significant, 
positive impact on institutional trust across all seven countries they study. If comparing 
this study to only one of the three mentioned above, one might simply suggest that 
variance in how studies measure social trust is the issue. But, these contradictory results, 
both with and without contradictions in this area, suggest that studies sharing at a 
minimum more than one methodological feature are necessary to resolve these issues.  
Finally, a not-insignificant amount of discussion has been dedicated to what 
extent traditionalism or traditional values play in shaping political trust. Wong, Wan, and 
Hsiao (2011) found no significant relationship between traditionalism and institutional 
trust, but their measure of traditionalism centered around the superiority of one’s 
traditional culture over another. By contrast, a number of studies, both looking at China 
in particular (e.g. Yang and Tang 2010; Zhai 2016) or in multi-country studies (e.g. Shi 
2001; Tang 2011; Ikeda 2013) have put forward the argument that some form of what is 
often called traditional social values, placing an emphasis on topics like attitudes towards 
hierarchy derived from the historical context of the East and Southeast Asian region, 
contribute to levels of political trust in the region. To borrow one explicit definition, 
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Ikeda (2013) argues that, “This measure [the traditional social values measure] reflects 
‘social values’ in daily social settings and positive attitudes toward paternalism, harmony 
orientation, and collectivism,” (pg. 20).  
Looking at the China-focused studies first, Yang and Tang (2010) look at trust in 
a battery of 13 different institutions, utilizing factor analysis to group them into 
administrative, legal, and societal categories. Yang and Tang (2010) narrow down their 
measure of traditional values to one category closely associated with Confucian 
traditions, attitudes towards hierarchy, and find that when controlling for other variables 
related to modernization, government performance, and the impact of mobilization efforts 
by the Chinese government, this measure of traditional values leads to a significant, 
positive increase in trust across all categories of institutions. Zhai (2016), however, takes 
a broader view of the topic, suggesting that although traditional values in China can be 
linked not only to Confucianism, but other religious and quasi-religious traditions like 
Daoism and Buddhism, it is possible to quantify these attitudes with a set of 11 questions 
and then sub-divide them into categories of family, social, and political values. Zhai 
(2016) finds that traditional social and traditional political values have a significant, 
positive impact on trust in both institutions (parliament, parties, the national government, 
and courts) and governmental officials, while traditional family values maintained this 
relationship only for officials. Altogether, these findings suggest that despite broad 
differences in the range of interpretation of traditional values, the operationalization of 
this interpretation, and differing sets of institutions, at least in the case of China, 
traditional social values are meaningful determinants of political trust.  
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In cross-country comparison studies, the impact of traditional social values on 
institutional trust is inconsistent, and it, unfortunately, marks a return to the types of 
issues found in a number of studies utilizing social trust. Tang (2011), measuring 
traditional social values via six questions broadly related to attitudes towards authority, 
views on conflict, and collective wellbeing, finds a positive relationship between this 
variable and institutional trust across the region, but there is no available regression-style 
analysis of this relationship present in the study. Due to the lack of such an analysis, and 
the subsequent commentary on the strength of the relationship relative to other factors, it 
is difficult to rely on that conclusion.  By contrast, Wang (2013) finds that in Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan, traditional social values, as measured with a battery of three 
questions, do not significantly influence political trust. But Ikeda (2013), looking at an 
aggregate data set of individuals from 11 countries in East and Southeast Asia finds that 
traditional social values have a significant, positive impact on political trust at the 
individual level, if not at the country level. What is to be made of these differences? 
Again, Ikeda (2013) and Wang (2013) utilize different waves of Asian Barometer Data, 
operationalize the measure via different methods, not only in that Ikeda uses a more 
expansive battery of questions but that the phrasing of many questions themselves 
changed from Wave 2 to Wave 3 of the ABS, and differ in the controls used, all of which 
has the potential to cause the observed differences. In much the same way that the area of 
social trust likely requires a convergence on methodology in order to come to more firm 
conclusions about the role it plays in shaping political trust in East and Southeast Asia, 
such convergence will likely be necessary for the role of traditional social values. 
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In a more general sense, what conclusions can we draw from the wider literature? 
First, while the claim that the institutional approach to understanding institutional trust is 
superior (e.g. Wong, Wan, and Hsiao 2011; Park 2017) may be premature, the assertion 
that “… national economic well-being and control of corruption play the most consistent 
role in determining political trust…” (Park 2017 pg. 503) is harder to dispute. Studies by 
Park (2017), Wong, Wan, and Hsiao (2011), Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013), Tang and Huhe 
(2016), and Wang (2013) all examine more than one country utilizing various 
methodological frameworks and find perceptions of corruption and economic 
performance are, generally, significant determinants of institutional trust. In other words, 
the consistent, significant presence of these measures across studies, apparent even 
despite differences in methodology, is a comparative rarity in the literature and therefore 
a meaningful reason to target a policy at one of these two areas if the goal of a policy 
proposal is to be applicable in as many contexts as possible. Wang (2013) provides 
further justification to focus on corruption, as he finds the positive impact on trust of 
increased evaluations of governmental performance is limited to a large extent when a 
person has concerns about corruption.  
Because of the consistency associated with the institutional approach across the 
wider literature, I will focus less on this approach to understanding institutional trust in 
this study. I will still control for such variables in my analysis, but in an effort to provide 
a greater contribution to the literature, I choose to on areas of continued debate. For this 
reason, more focus will be paid to understanding specific aspects of the cultural approach 
to institutional trust.  
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Second, one issue that repeatedly surfaces in the wider literature is a lack of 
methodological consistency, an issue that likely needs to be resolved moving forward. 
How to begin to resolve this issue, however, is a difficult question. Not only are there 
serious differences in methodology associated with meaningful differences in conclusions 
not only in the battery of institutions utilized to create a measure of political trust, as the 
discussion in the first debate highlights, but also as it relates to determinants of 
institutional trust themselves. Any suggestions aimed at correcting these methodological 
differences, then, should target at least one of these areas.  
It is my recommendation that, in an effort to begin to address such 
methodological inconsistencies, it would be beneficial to come to an agreement on a 
minimum battery of institutions to include in any index of institutional trust. At a 
minimum, the justifications utilized by Mishler and Rose (2001) and then implemented in 
several other studies (Chang and Chu 2006; Chi and Kwon 2016), wherein the battery of 
institutions consists of parliament, the prime minister/president, police, the military, 
courts, and the police, provide an acceptable baseline. This is not to suggest that there be 
no flexibility in terms of grouping institutions for analysis. But it is important that such 
decisions are made with sound reasoning behind them, as done with statistical 
justification by Yang and Tang (2010), in order to tap into a theme that non-grouped 
institutions could not, as done by Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) for partisanship, or due to 
data restrictions. Moving forward into the quantitative analysis chapters, I will attempt to 
consistently utilize such a broader definition of institutional trust.  
 Keeping these conclusions in mind, and cognizant of the vast number of potential 
avenues by which to investigate the determinants of institutional trust, I choose to narrow 
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my focus down to three key topics, two of which I develop into hypotheses and one 
which, while not a hypothesis, I still devote a portion of the analysis to. First, using Wave 
4 data from the Asian Barometer Survey, what is the relationship between traditional 
social values and institutional trust at the regional and country-level in East and Southeast 
Asia? Second, can we attribute the inconsistent results associated with measures of social 
capital to differences in the operationalization of variables? And third, building on the 
work of Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013), what is the relationship between partisanship and 
institutional trust when controlling for a wider number of additional variables, including 
traditional social values? Keeping in mind the relevant discussion of the current state of 
the literature on these topics, I put forward the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Controlling for other factors, traditional social values should positively 
correlate with institutional trust.  
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for other factors, voting for the winning party of the last 
election should positively correlate with institutional trust. The magnitude of this 
relationship should be diminished for non-partisan institutions.   
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INSTITUTIONAL TRUST AND TRADITIONAL SOCIAL VALUES 
Data and Methods 
 This project utilizes data from the 4th Wave of the Asian Barometer Survey 
(ABS), which contains survey results from 14 different countries and territories in East 
and Southeast Asia (Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, China, Mongolia, the Philippines, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar). 
The surveys constituting the 4th Wave of the ABS were conducted between 2014 and 
20162, and sample sizes for each individual country range from approximately 1,000 
respondents to as many as 4,000, with a regional sample size of 19,467. Of interest for 
this research project, the ABS survey provides a relatively holistic battery of questions 
suitable for an investigation into the potential determinants of institutional trust. Not only 
does the ABS survey contain a battery of questions designed to measure trust in 13 
different political and non-political institutions, but it also has sections dedicated to voter 
behavior, social trust and social capital, views on governmental performance, 
traditionalism, and so on. It should be noted, however, that due to certain restrictions on 
the questions asked in a subset of the 4th Wave countries, particularly as it relates to 
questions on trust in various institutions, there is some limit to the extent that cross-
national comparisons can be made.  
 
2 Surveys in each country were conducted in the following time periods: Taiwan – June through November 
2014; Singapore - October through December 2014; Philippines – July 2014; Mongolia – June through 
August 2014; Thailand – August through October 2014; Malaysia – September through November 2014; 
China – December 2014 through June 2016; Myanmar – January through March 2015; Indonesia – January 
2016; Vietnam – September through October 2015; Hong Kong – February through April 2016; Japan – 
March 2016; South Korea – October through December 2015; Cambodia October through November 2015.  
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Dependent Variable 
 One of the most important methodological decisions in this project is what 
method to use to operationalize institutional trust. As highlighted in the literature review, 
there are a wide array of methods used in the relevant literature, many of them with their 
own potential benefits and issues. However, in line with my prior observations about the 
current state of the literature, any method must fulfill two major criteria:  
1. The method used should be applicable to as many countries in the dataset as 
possible. This will not only allow for country-to-country comparisons to 
determine whether the models developed in this paper work equally well in each 
country contained in the sample, but it will also provide the most latitude for 
future research on the topic to be compared against the results found in this paper.  
2. The method should incorporate a relatively broad set of institutions into its 
measurement of institutional trust. The review of the relevant literature suggests 
that such choices matter, and studies that limit a definition of institutional trust to 
only a small subset of institutions investigated in the ABS survey risk missing 
valuable insights into the determinants of institutional trust.  
Unfortunately, any operationalization method that attempts to fulfill both criteria 
immediately runs into several issues. First, although the 4th Wave ABS Survey contains 
questions on a battery of 13 separate institutions3, due to issues such as structural 
differences between the 14 countries included in the survey, questions on trust in the 
 
3 The full list includes: The president or prime minister, the courts, the national government located in the 
capital city, political parties, parliament, the civil service, the military or armed forces, the police, the local 
government, newspapers, television, the election commission, and NGOs. The election commission and 
NGOs are listed as optional questions in the survey.  
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executive office, political parties, local government, the election commission, and NGOs 
are not asked in at least one country. As some of these, particularly institutions like the 
executive office, seem quite relevant to a comprehensive measure of institutional trust, 
this presents potential issues in attempts to create a model that works for every country in 
the sample. Second, respondents in Vietnam were not presented the same answer choices 
for the institutional trust questions as the rest of the sample. Respondents in every 
country except Vietnam were presented with a 4-point Likert scale asking them to 
indicate how much they trust each institution, ranging from “A great deal of trust” to 
“None at all”, as well as options such as declining to answer. In Vietnam, however, 
respondents have only three answers to indicate their level of trust: “A great deal of 
trust,” “Quite a lot of trust,” or “Some trust.” This means that it is impossible to directly 
compare Vietnam to the rest of the sample, and because of this I choose to exclude 
Vietnam from the analysis entirely. 
 From there, I create two distinct indexes of institutional trust, Trust Index 1 to 
apply to all 13 remaining countries in the sample and Trust Index 2 to apply to a nine-
country subset, the countries where questions about all of the institutions composing 
Trust Index 2 were asked. The former utilizes only those questions pertaining to 
institutions that were asked about in every country in the set and so excludes questions 
regarding the executive branch of government, local government, political parties, the 
election commission, and NGOs. Additionally, while there is likely some value in 
knowing to what extent respondents trust T.V. and newspapers as sources of information, 
I choose to not include these institutions in my indexed measure as they in many cases 
are not explicitly political groups, a government branch, or otherwise a governmental 
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organ. As such, the first institutional trust index only contains respondents’ evaluations of 
the courts, the national government, parliament, the civil service, the military, and the 
police.  
However, in order to have a measure that incorporates other important organs of 
government like the executive office, I also choose to create a second index including 
evaluations of all possible institutions excluding newspapers, television, and NGOs. 
While this index applies to only nine countries in the set4 and necessitates running a 
second set of models, this is the best compromise available between a model that 
incorporates and allows comparisons between as many countries as possible and a model 
that does not exclude potentially important institutions from its operationalization of 
institutional trust.5 The first model, applicable to all 13 countries, will permit a full, 
regional comparison, whereas the second model with allow for a more comprehensive 
definition of institutional trust to be tested on a subset of countries. Moreover, at least for 
the nine countries present in both sets of data, I will be able to directly compare the two 
models to analyze what impact defining the dependent variable of analysis more 
comprehensively has on the regression results.  
Independent Variables 
The various independent variables in this study draw heavily from prior literature 
on the topic of institutional trust in East and Southeast Asia. First, in line with most of the 
 
4 China, Singapore, Indonesia, and Hong Kong all fail to ask at least questions regarding at least one of the 
10 institutions (The executive office, courts, national government, political parties, parliament, the civil 
service, the military, the police, the local government, and the election commission) included in this second 
index.  
5 While there are slight variations in the mean level of trust as measured by Trust Index 1 and Trust Index 2 
for the nine countries for which the two measures are applicable, this variance is in each case less than .1 
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previous literature, this project attempts to capture the impact of the evaluation of 
governmental performance on institutional trust via a question on respondents’ views of 
the current economic situation in their country. To measure this, I use Question 1 of the 
4th Wave ABS Survey, which reads, “How would you rate the overall economic condition 
of our country today?” utilizes a 5-point Likert scale ranging from very good (1) to very 
bad (5), which I recoded as very bad (1) to very good (5). Additionally, in line with 
works such as Park (2017), I also choose to include Question 4 of the ABS Survey, “As 
for your own family, how do you rate the economic situation of your family today,” in 
order to account for any potential difference in a respondent’s economic evaluation of 
their personal situation versus the national situation. Question 4 is recoded in the same 
manner as Question 1.  
 The second independent variable included in this study is corruption. While the 
ABS Survey provides several different ways to tap into the issue of corruption, I choose 
to follow a number of previous studies in looking at corruption through the lenses of 
governmental efforts to combat corruption. To capture perceptions of anti-corruption 
efforts, I utilize Question 119, which reads, “In your opinion, is the government working 
to crack down on corruption and root out bribery?”. This is akin to the operationalization 
of the variable as done by studies such as Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013), although it might 
also be reasonable to follow studies such as Park (2017) and Wang (2013), who use a 
question asking about how widespread corrupt behavior is. Using Question 119, 
respondents are presented with a 4-point Likert scale with response ranging from “It is 
doing its best” (1) to “Doing nothing” (4), but I recode this variable so that “It is doing its 
best” correlates to 4 and “Doing nothing” correlates to 1.  
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 The third and fourth independent variables included in this study relate to social 
capital. As discussed in the literature review, studies looking at social capital have taken a 
few different approaches to this topic. Some restrict their analysis solely to social trust, 
while others control for both this and membership in a variety of civic organizations. To 
be as comprehensive as possible, I follow with the latter category, and as such I attempt 
to capture the impact of social capital with two different variables. The first is 
membership in a variety of civic organizations. Via the ABS Survey, this is captured with 
questions 20-22, asking respondents to name various organizations that they belong to. 
Wang (2013) uses the absolute number of organizations as a measure of this variable, 
however, the 4th Wave data set contains a variable “fq” indicating whether the respondent 
is a member of any formal organization which I have recoded from “Yes” (1) and “No” 
(2) to a dichotomous variable where being a member of formal organization is coded as 1 
and not being a member is coded as 0. This is in line with the way that Huang, Lee, and 
Lin (2013) operationalize the variable. Additionally, I utilize two different methods to 
capture social trust. First, in line with studies such as Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013), Park 
(2017), and Wang (2013), I utilize Question 23 of the ABS Survey, “Generally speaking, 
would you say that ‘most people can be trusted’ or ‘that you must be careful in dealing 
with people?” While this variable was initiated coded so that “Most people can be 
trusted,” was a 1 and, “You must be very careful in dealing with people,” was a 2, I 
recode this so that a value of 0 indicates a lack of trust in others and a value of 1 indicates 
trust in other people. But, in order to test whether a different operationalization of social 
trust would alter its relationship with institutional trust, I also follow the general method 
put forward by Mujani and Liddle (2013) and construct an indexed measure of social 
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trust, utilizing questions 23 and 26-28 of the ABS survey6. Questions 26-28 ask 
respondents to what extent they trust a subset of the population: relatives, neighbors, and 
others you interact with, respectively. For each question, the response options consist of a 
4-point Likert scale ranging from “A great deal of trust,” (1) to “None at all,” (4)7, with 
these options recoded in reverse order. Once recoded, Questions 26-28 are converted into 
values of 0 or 1 to indicate non-trusting or trusting and all and four questions are summed 
to create an indexed social trust measure.  
 Of note, even a cursory glance at the distributions of answers to the questions 
composing these two operationalizations suggests that the choice of method will 
potentially affect the relationship between social trust and institutional trust. In Table 1.1 
below, the responses to questions 26-28 have been recoded so that 0 represents not 
trusting and 1 represents trusting. Missing values are not included in the table. For the 
dichotomous measure of social trust commonly utilized in the literature, the vast majority 
of the survey sample believes they must be careful in dealing with others. However, in 
the case of trusting relatives and neighbors the lion’s share of the survey sample falls into 
the trusting category. Moreover, while there does appear to be a decrease in trust as the 
circle of people expands, at somewhere between 14-15% per stage, even when this is 
extended to include the wider population that respondents interact with, most of the 
survey believe they can trust others. This stands in direct contrast to the more common, 
single-question measure of social trust, where only 28.8% of the sample felt that most 
 
6 One of the questions used in the index created by Mujani and Liddle (2013) is not asked in Indonesia as 
part of the Wave 4 survey. In the interests of including Indonesia in the remainder of the analysis, I choose 
to use the other four questions to create a four-point scale.  
7 The full range of responses is: “A great deal of trust” (1); “Quite a lot of trust” (2); “Not very much trust” 
(3); “None at all” (4).  
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people can be trusted. This disparity reinforces the notion that it will be useful to test both 
measures of social trust in further analysis and compare to what extent the performance 
of the two measures vary.  
 Table 1.1: Responses to Social Trust Questions 
 
Social Trust 
Dichotomous 
Measure 
Trust in Relatives Trust in Neighbors 
Trust in Others 
you Interact With  
 Frequency  Percent Frequency  Percent Frequency  Percent Frequency  Percent  
0 13186 67.7 2410 12.4 5375 27.6 8050 41.4  
1 5613 28.8 16787 86.2 13547 69.6 10651 54.7  
Total 18800 96.6 19198 98.6 18922 97.2 18701 96.1  
 
 Fifth, one of the core independent variables in this project is the measure of the 
respondent’s traditionalism, or traditional social values (TSV). While discussed in more 
depth in the literature review, it is important to reiterate that there are a variety of ways in 
which to conceivably operationalize this measure of traditionalism or TSV, ranging from 
Wang, Wan, and Hsiao’s (2011) definition of traditionalism as belief in the supremacy of 
one’s traditional culture over another society’s, to Wang’s (2013) three-question index, to 
the various models that Ikeda (2013) develops based on prior research and analysis of the 
Asian Barometer dataset. In this paper, I utilize a definition that Ikeda (2013) tests, 
specifically the seven-question battery for an overarching traditionalism scale, for a few 
key reasons.  
First, as it relates to Wang, Wan, and Hsiao (2011), the measure they use to define 
traditionalism is very specific, and rather than tapping into the extent that a respondent 
holds onto traditional cultural beliefs, it instead seems likely to measure something akin 
to cultural nationalism. By contrast, the models that Wang (2013) and Ikeda (2013) 
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utilize, based on data from prior waves of the Asian Barometer Survey, seem to much 
more directly tap into cultural views. However, Wang (2013) chooses to utilize the 2nd 
Wave of the Asian Barometer Survey, whereas Ikeda (2013) utilizes the 3rd Wave, and 
this decision has important implications for the replicability of their respective models.  
Between the 2nd and 3rd Waves of the Asian Barometer Survey, the battery of questions 
related to traditionalism changed significantly, with 11 questions either having altered 
wording or being entirely new in the 3rd Wave as compared to the 2nd Wave. By contrast, 
the 3rd and 4th Wave sections on traditionalism are remarkably similar, with only a single 
question having been removed in the latter survey. Importantly, this means that the 
operationalization of traditionalism that Ikeda (2013) utilizes in his study on 3rd Wave 
data can be replicated with the 4th Wave data used in this paper.  
Each of the questions present in the 4th Wave survey’s battery on traditionalism are 4-
point Likert scales, asking respondents to indicate to what extent they agree with a series 
of statements, with responses ranging from “Strongly Agree” (1) to “Strongly Disagree” 
(4). I first recode each of these variables so that “Strongly Disagree” corresponds to 1 and 
“Strongly Agree” corresponds to 4. Then, I create an index following the method Ikeda 
(2013) utilizes, incorporating the recoded variants of questions 55, 57, 60, 62, 63, 64, and 
658, wherein the mean of the summed responses to these questions is calculated, forming 
a new 1-4 scale. 
 
8 Questions composing the scale: Q55 - “For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal 
interests second.”; Q57 – “For the sake of national interest, individual interest could be sacrificed.”; Q60 - 
Even if parents’ demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.”; Q62 – “Being a 
student, one should not question the authority of their teacher.”; Q63 – “In a group, we should avoid open 
quarrel to preserve the harmony of the group.”; Q64 – “Even if there is some disagreement with others, one 
should avoid the conflict.”; Q65 – “A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers 
disagree with him.” 
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The prior literature on traditional social values in the region has largely focused 
itself on what Tan and Tambyah (2011) term, “Confucian Asia” – China, Japan, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Hong Kong.  Tang (2011), for example, 
makes an explicit connection to Confucianism, arguing that, “… we cannot conduct our 
analysis by relying on perspectives taken from Western culturalism that make no 
allowance for the importance of Confucian values in East Asian cultures,” (pg. 12). Wang 
(2013) limits his analysis of traditionalism to only Confucian Asia, looking at China, 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Yang and Tang (2010) similarly explicitly link attitudes 
towards hierarchy with the Confucian tradition, and even Zhai (2016), who acknowledges 
the influence of non-Confucian traditions on Chinese thought, limits in-depth analysis to 
China and data-based comparisons of traditional values to Confucian Asia proper. These 
studies showcase at least some consensus on the need to test the role of traditional social 
values in shaping institutional trust in a subset of the wider region.  
 While there are certainly reasonable arguments to be made for the applicability of 
the traditionalism measures as defined by the 4th Wave Asian Barometer Survey to be 
applicable in what Tan and Tambyah (2011) term “Confucian Asia,” it is important to 
discuss whether such a measure would be appropriate for the rest of the region. A simple 
country-by-country comparison of the mean scores for the traditional social values 
highlights an interesting trend that supports the assertion that the measure is capturing a 
set of ideal and beliefs that are not solely limited to “Confucian Asia,”, but that is also 
present across the wider ABS region and, as Ikeda (2013) notes in his study looking at all 
11 East and Southeast Asian countries included in Wave 3 of the Asian Barometer 
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survey, potentially in other regions across the globe9. Countries that would seemingly 
have more direct engagement with Confucian thought, for example, China, Taiwan, 
Japan, and South Korea, fall on the lower end of the scales for the measure of 
traditionalism, whereas the other countries in the 4th Wave data set actually exhibit higher 
levels.  
Table 1.2: Mean TSV Scores by Country 
Mean TSV Scores by Country 
Country Mean TSV Value 
Japan 2.5 
Hong Kong 2.52 
Korea 2.57 
China 2.75 
Mongolia 3.01 
Philippines 3.07 
Taiwan 2.65 
Thailand 2.91 
Indonesia 3.12 
Singapore 2.78 
Cambodia 3.06 
Malaysia 3.1 
Myanmar 3.39 
 
 One potential explanation for this is that solely defining the set of beliefs that the 
Asian Barometer traditionalism battery of questions attempts to capture as ‘Confucian’ is 
incorrect; as Zhai (2016) notes while using this battery of questions to tap into the impact 
of traditionalism on institutional trust in China, at least in the Chinese case Buddhism and 
 
9 Specifically, Ikeda (2013) argues that, “What we mean by “Asian” in this essay is that the traditional 
social values detailed here are widely supported in the East/Southeast Asian area. It does not deny that the 
same value configuration has support in other areas of the world,” (pg. 20). 
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Taoism also play important roles in shaping traditional Chinese thought. That 
traditionally “Confucian” Asia actually falls on the lower end of these two measures of 
traditionalism, then, supports the assertion that the ABS measure is in fact picking up a 
more wide-ranging set of beliefs, not solely Confucian beliefs. Understanding the ABS 
measure of traditional social values in these terms, not as values ascribed to a single 
tradition but as values that can be identified in a number of unique cultural backgrounds, 
suggests that it is reasonable to apply such a measure to every country in the data set, not 
just a sub-set therein.   
Finally, the regression analysis conducted in this paper will include a variety of 
additional control variables. In addition to traditional demographic variables such as age, 
education, gender, and income, I also choose to include a Freedom House score for each 
country so as to attempt to capture any facets of living in a comparatively more or less 
authoritarian society that are not picked up by other variables used in my analysis. In 
other words, this variable attempts to identify to what extent, controlling for other factors, 
regime type influences institutional trust. In order to do this, I created a new variable in 
the data set, “FreedomHouse,” setting the value of the variable to the Freedom House 
score of the respondent’s country in the year that the survey was conducted.10 
 Taking in the full account of relevant variables, in the following section I will 
conduct regression analysis on the 4th Wave ABS data set, testing the relationship 
between traditional social values and institutional trust, controlling for the other 
 
10 For the year that surveys were conducted, Myanmar did not receive a traditional PolityIV score, as the 
country underwent a transition in 2015. Additionally, Hong Kong as a territory does not receive a PolityIV 
Score. Because of these issues, and since every country/territory in this data set receives a Freedom House 
score, I choose to use Freedom House rather than PolityIV as a proxy for living in a more or less 
authoritarian system. 
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independent variables discussed above. This analysis will first be conducted on the full 
13-country data set, utilizing Trust Index 1, and afterward this analysis will be re-run on 
the nine-country data set, utilizing Trust Index 2. In each case, I will additionally dis-
aggregate the data set and re-run the analysis on a country by country level to pick up any 
variation in the relative effectiveness of the models.  
Results and Discussion 
Before diving into detailed regression analysis of the determinants of institutional 
trust, it is helpful to have a general understanding of the levels of institutional trust in the 
13 countries under study. Table 1.3 below displays the mean value of Trust Index 1 by 
country along with the respective countries’ Freedom House scores for the year that 
surveys were conducted in that country. Based on Table 1.3, there is a noticeable level of 
variance within the region. The mean for the entire region is 2.6894, and seven of the 
thirteen countries’ average levels of institutional trust fall below this point. These levels 
fall as low as 2.25 in South Korea and rise as high as 3.07 in China, .82 points on a scale 
ranging from 1 to 4. In line with much of the recent discussion on low levels of political 
trust in democratic societies, it is telling that it is the comparatively long-standing 
democracies of the region, such as Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, in which trust is 
lowest. Moreover, of the six countries with a Freedom House score of six or less on the 
overall 14-point scale11, five of them (Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, Philippines, and 
Taiwan) all fall below the regional mean for political trust. These findings suggest reason 
 
11 When utilizing the Freedom House measure, a lower score indicates that a country is relatively freer than 
a country with a higher score. As such, the fact that lower Freedom House scores seem to be associated 
with lower levels of institutional trust means that freer countries appear to have lower levels of institutional 
trust.  
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for concern among scholars tracking the decline in institutional trust in democracies 
across the globe.  
Table 1.3: Mean Trust Levels by Country (Trust Index 1) 
Mean Trust Levels by Country for Trust Index 1  
Country Mean Standard Error of Mean Freedom House Score 
Japan 2.48 0.02 2 
Hong Kong 2.55 0.02 7 
Korea 2.25 0.01 5 
China 3.07 0.01 13 
Mongolia 2.46 0.01 4 
Philippines 2.51 0.02 6 
Taiwan 2.28 0.01 3 
Thailand 2.78 0.02 11 
Indonesia 2.77 0.01 6 
Singapore 3.05 0.02 8 
Cambodia 2.73 0.02 11 
Malaysia 2.98 0.02 8 
Myanmar 2.41 0.02 11 
 
Keeping this regional variation in mind, I first run OLS regression analysis on the 
full thirteen-country data set with Trust Index 112 as the dependent variable, creating 
three models. I test these models first for the regional data sample with all countries 
included, and then I additionally test the models for each country. The first model 
contains only factors that have regularly been investigated in the wider literature on 
institutional trust in the region: Evaluations of the national and local economic situation, 
perceptions of anti-corruption efforts, as well as social trust and social capital. In these 
models, social trust is defined using a dichotomous variable derived from the response to 
Question 23 from the ABS Survey. In Model 2, I introduce the measure of traditional 
 
12 Trust Index 1 is composed of only trust in the courts, the national government, parliament, the civil 
service, the military, and the police.  
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social values (TSV) as operationalized by Ikeda (2013), Finally, Model 3 introduces 
various other control variables, namely gender, education, income, and a Freedom House 
score assigned by the related score of the respondent’s country.  
Table 1.4 Trust Index 1 Regional-Level OLS Regression 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
  
B Std. 
Error 
Beta 
  
1 (Constant) 1.358 0.024   56.035 0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.205 0.005 0.324 40.568 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.009 0.006 0.012 1.482 0.138  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.227 0.006 0.297 39.104 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.076 0.01 0.057 7.719 0  
Organizational Membership -0.027 0.009 -0.022 -2.973 0.003 
2 (Constant) 0.981 0.033   29.591 0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.195 0.005 0.309 38.753 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.008 0.006 0.01 1.258 0.208  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.219 0.006 0.287 37.975 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.098 0.01 0.073 9.931 0  
Organizational Membership -0.042 0.009 -0.034 -4.625 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.15 0.009 0.123 16.488 0 
3 (Constant) 1.028 0.038   27.254 0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.163 0.005 0.258 31.605 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.029 0.006 0.036 4.665 0  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.21 0.006 0.275 37.021 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.101 0.01 0.075 10.347 0  
Organizational Membership 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.864 0.387  
Traditionalism Index 0.102 0.009 0.084 11.016 0  
Female 0 0.009 0 -0.053 0.957  
Freedom House Score 0.026 0.001 0.151 18.513 0  
Education -0.018 0.002 -0.076 -9.574 0  
Income Quintiles 0.013 0.004 0.028 3.686 0 
Model R R Square Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .502a 0.252 0.252 0.5227 
2 .516b 0.266 0.266 0.51767 
3 .542c 0.294 0.293 0.50796 
  
This regression analysis offers several useful insights, but it also raises a few 
important questions. First, in every model, respondents’ evaluations of the national 
economic situation (Q1) and evaluations of governmental anti-corruption efforts (Q119) 
have a positive, significant impact on institutional trust. That these are consistent across 
all three models and the magnitude of the associated coefficients are the largest in each 
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model reinforces the broader conclusion that can be drawn from the literature: 
evaluations of governmental performance, utilizing the national economic situation as a 
proxy, and evaluations of government anti-corruption efforts are reliable determinants of 
institutional trust in the region. Interestingly, while respondents’ evaluations of their 
family economic situation (Q4) do not reach significance in Model 1 or Model 2, it does 
so in Model 3; however, even in Model 3 the coefficient is much smaller than the 
coefficient associated with Q1. 
 Moreover, this trend continues when Trust Index 1 is tested on the country level13, 
rather than considering the entire sample on aggregate. In each model where Q4 is 
significant at p <= .05, it exerts a notably smaller, but still positive effect on institutional 
trust than the evaluation of the national economic situation. Compounding this issue, at 
the country level Q4 repeatedly fails to reach the level of significance. For Hong Kong, 
South Korea, China, Thailand, Indonesia (p-value of .055 in Model 3) and Myanmar, Q4 
is not significant in all three models. For Cambodia, and the Philippines, Q4 is only 
significant in Model 3, in Taiwan it is significant in Model 2 and Model 3, although the 
p-value in Model 1 is .053, and in Singapore Q4 is only significant in models 1 and 2, 
failing to reach significance in Model 3.   
What to make of these trends? At a minimum, while evaluations of familial 
economic situation do seem to have some impact on levels of institutional trust at the 
regional level, and in a small subset of the data at the country level, this impact is much 
smaller as compared to evaluations of the national economic situation. Combine this with 
 
13 See Appendix 1.1 for the country-level regression models; only model three is included for brevity.   
40 
 
the fact that Q4 so often fails to reach significance at the country level, and this suggests 
that evaluations of the national economic situation are a more consistent determinant of 
institutional trust than family economic evaluations. One potential explanation as to why 
evaluations of family economic situation fail to significantly influence institutional trust 
is that respondents might fail to link the particulars of their own economic situation to 
government actions, reducing the role that this evaluation plays in shaping institutional 
trust, whereas they more explicitly link the national economic situation to governmental 
performance, more drastically influencing institutional trust.  
 Second, the various demographic and other control variables present something of 
a mixed message. As it relates to the demographic controls, there does not appear to be 
any particular pattern to be observed. The significance of gender, income, and education 
varies greatly from country to country. Moreover, the direction of these relationships is 
not consistent between the regional model and the country models, or even between 
countries. By contrast, at the regional level the Freedom House score is significantly and 
positively correlated with institutional trust; higher Freedom House scores, and therefore 
‘less free’ countries, tend to have higher levels of institutional trust.  
Third, this analysis offers some insight into the accuracy of Hypothesis 1. While 
this model does not control for partisanship, at the regional level the seven-question 
operationalization of traditional social values has a significant, positive impact on 
institutional trust for both Model 2 and Model 3 (the two models which include TSV as a 
variable). Admittedly, the magnitude of the coefficient in each model is somewhat lower 
than the coefficients attached to questions about the national economic situation and anti-
corruption efforts. At the same time, the fact that it reaches significance at a p-value of 0 
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seems to suggest that, contrary to the findings of studies such as Wang (2013), traditional 
social values do have a significant impact on shaping institutional trust in the region. 
Moreover, these results are largely in line with the findings of Ikeda (2013), utilizing the 
same operationalization of TSV on a new set of data, and this displays that there is at 
least some degree of replicability over time in the impact of TSV on institutional trust. 
 In addition, whereas a country-level analysis casts doubt on the consistency of 
evaluations of familial economic situations as a determinant of institutional trust, this 
type of analysis instead further supports Hypothesis 1. There is some variance between 
the magnitude of the associated coefficient for each country, but for all the countries in 
the data set, the seven-question measure of traditional social values is statistically 
significant to at least the .05 level. In terms of consistency, then, this places traditional 
social values in the same category as the national economic situation and anti-corruption 
efforts, by far the two most consistently significant determinants of institutional trust 
tested in the broader literature. Altogether, then, I find initial evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 1 based on an analysis of Trust Index 1, regardless of whether this analysis is 
conducted on the regional sample or country-specific samples, although it is still 
necessary to test this relationship when partisanship is factored into the model.  
 Moreover, this regression analysis offers some insights into the relationship 
between social capital, both in terms of participation in organizations as well as social 
trust, and institutional trust. At the regional level, membership in an organization displays 
a significant relationship with institutional trust in Model 1 and Model 2. Surprisingly, 
considering the wider literature’s predictions related to social capital, the direction of this 
relationship is negative. However, there are two caveats to these results that call into 
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doubt the veracity of this relationship. For one, when controlling for gender, education, 
income, and the Freedom House score of respondents in Model 3, membership in an 
organization fails to reach significance with a p-value of .387. For another, the 
relationship between institutional trust and organizational membership at the country-
level varies greatly from country to country. Of the 13 countries in the data set, 
organizational membership reaches significance in at least one model in seven countries. 
In Hong Kong, South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, Thailand, and Myanmar, organizational 
membership has a significant and positive impact on institutional trust in all three models. 
In Singapore, this relationship is negative but significant only for Model 1. In the other 
six countries, the variable fails to reach significance with 95% certainty in any model. In 
other words, the impact of organizational membership on political trust varies based on 
location, and this level of variance at the country level potentially explains the 
unexpected results at the regional level.  
 Finally, this analysis offers insight into the role that social trust plays in shaping 
institutional trust. At the regional level, social trust as measured by a dichotomous 
variable is significant in each of the three models tested, and this relationship between 
social trust and institutional trust is positive. Relative to the magnitude of the coefficients 
associated with anti-corruption efforts or evaluations of the national economy, the impact 
of social trust is somewhat smaller. Again, however, the regional level analysis does not 
tell the entire story. As compared to organizational membership, social trust performs 
much better at the country level of analysis, having a significant, positive relationship 
with institutional trust for all models in each country except Mongolia, Cambodia, and 
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Taiwan. For the former two countries, social trust is not significant in any model, and in 
Taiwan it is only significant for Model 3.  
Table 1.5: Trust Index One OLS Regression with Social Trust Index 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 1.252 0.024 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.202 0.005 0.321 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.564  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.215 0.006 0.282 0  
Organizational Membership -0.035 0.009 -0.028 0  
Social Trust Index 0.078 0.004 0.154 0 
2 (Constant) 0.872 0.033 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.193 0.005 0.305 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.75  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.208 0.006 0.272 0  
Organizational Membership -0.05 0.009 -0.04 0  
Social Trust Index 0.081 0.004 0.16 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.15 0.009 0.123 0 
3 (Constant) 0.915 0.037 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.158 0.005 0.251 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.024 0.006 0.03 0  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.198 0.006 0.259 0  
Organizational Membership 0.003 0.009 0.002 0.741  
Social Trust Index 0.086 0.004 0.169 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.1 0.009 0.082 0  
Female 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.329  
Education -0.019 0.002 -0.079 0  
Income Quintiles 0.011 0.003 0.023 0.002  
Freedom House Score 0.028 0.001 0.16 0 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .522a 0.272 0.272 0.51584 
 
2 .536b 0.287 0.286 0.51062 
 
3 .563c 0.317 0.317 0.49974 
 
 
 Using these results as a baseline, I run an additional round of analysis for both the 
regional level and the country level in order to test the impact of operationalizing social 
trust via two different methodologies. As part of this process, the models are identical 
except for the fact that, rather than operationalizing social trust as a dichotomous 
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variable, I instead use the general method utilized by Mujani and Liddle (2013), creating 
an index of responses to four separate questions14 to measure social trust. I test these new 
models at both the regional and country level.15 Looking only at social trust, at the 
regional level, while the size of the standardized coefficient associated with social trust is 
notably larger than when a dichotomous measure is used, there is no difference in terms 
of the direction of the relationship or the significance between social trust and 
institutional trust dependent on the operationalization of social trust. Both 
operationalizations have a significant, positive impact in all three models. At the country 
level of analysis, however, there are some immediate differences. Whereas the 
dichotomous measure of social trust fails to reach significance in Cambodia, Mongolia, 
and in two models in Taiwan, the index operationalization achieves significance in every 
model in each country. This result in some way supports the idea that divergent 
operationalizations of social trust can result in different outcomes; there are differences in 
the statistical significance of social trust dependent on the operationalization16. But these 
differences are limited to only three of the thirteen countries analyzed, so differences in 
operationalization cannot adequately explain the extent of the variation in results that 
prior studies testing the relationship between social trust and institutional trust have 
found.  
 
 
 
15 See Appendix 1.2 for the country-level regression models; only model three is included for brevity.  
16This study focuses on the quantitative impact of different operationalizations of social trust, but Ikeda 
(2013) provides a brief discussion of the difference between,” … trust in others one already knows…”, “… 
trust in a category that one knows is trustful, in general, such as medical doctors…,” and, “… when one 
judges an unknown other (upon first contact) as trustable…” (pg. 18). While it is largely outside of the 
scope of this study, these two different operationalizations might tap into these different types of trust, 
leading to the different outcomes observed.  
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Table 1.6: Trust Index Two Regional-Level OLS Regression 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
  
1 (Constant) 1.302 0.027   48.915 0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.204 0.006 0.329 34.236 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.028 0.007 0.037 3.876 0 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.2 0.006 0.285 31.224 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.02 0.012 0.015 1.673 0.094  
Organizational Membership 0.012 0.01 0.01 1.144 0.252 
2 (Constant) 0.842 0.036   23.208 0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.186 0.006 0.3 31.317 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.028 0.007 0.038 4.058 0 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.187 0.006 0.266 29.414 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.046 0.012 0.034 3.87 0  
Organizational Membership 0.013 0.01 0.011 1.272 0.203  
Traditionalism Index 0.184 0.01 0.165 18.283 0 
3 (Constant) 1.041 0.041   25.167 0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.165 0.006 0.266 27.38 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.045 0.007 0.061 6.466 0 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.187 0.006 0.267 29.886 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.062 0.012 0.046 5.248 0  
Organizational Membership 0.028 0.01 0.024 2.749 0.006  
Traditionalism Index 0.126 0.011 0.113 11.764 0  
Female 0.006 0.01 0.005 0.597 0.551  
Freedom House Score 0.015 0.002 0.088 8.608 0  
Education -0.022 0.002 -0.095 -9.227 0  
Income Quintiles -0.004 0.004 -0.008 -0.828 0.408 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .492a 0.242 0.242 0.4976 
2 .517b 0.267 0.267 0.4892 
3 .536c 0.287 0.286 0.48272 
 
 Moving on to the nine-country subset, I recreate the above analysis with the same 
three models, this time using Trust Index 2 rather than Trust Index 1. As such, Trust 
Index 2 allows for the analysis to tap into responses to a battery of ten institutions (The 
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executive office, courts, national government, political parties, parliament, the civil 
service, the military, the police, the local government, and the election commission). 
When compared to the 13-country model, at the regional level there are slight but 
important differences in results. Whereas social trust is significant at the .05 level in all 
three models at the regional level and organizational membership is significant at this 
level in models 1 and 2, utilizing Trust Index 2 these two variables fail to attain 
significance at the .05 level in Model 1 (with p-values of .094 and .252, respectively), and 
organizational membership again fails to reach significance in Model 2. Interestingly, 
both variables are significant in Model 3, whereas organizational membership failed to 
reach significance in the 13-country subset. Additionally, Q4 is significant in all three 
models, whereas it is only significant in Model Three for the 13-country subset. Because 
several countries have been removed from the sample, though, it is difficult to isolate 
whether these differences are due to the additional institutions added to the institutional 
trust index or the removed cases from the four countries that were dropped. To further 
dive into these differences, it is more beneficial to directly compare the country-level 
results17.  
 Unfortunately, when comparing the country-level models for the nine countries 
included in both analyses, few clear patterns emerge. Certainly, there are some 
differences. Relative to the Trust Index 1 measure, in South Korea familial economic 
evaluations are significant in all three models, in Taiwan Q4 is significant in Model 1, 
and in Cambodia social trust barely fails to meet the 95% confidence level for 
significance, with a p-value of .051. However, these changes are often isolated to singular 
 
17 See Appendix 1.3 for the country-level models.  
47 
 
models, and are minimal at best. As such, these results seem to suggest that, on the 
margins, the decision of which institutions to include in a measure of institutional trust 
does have some ability to impact the interpretation of some of the determinants of 
institutional trust, but this decision does not impact each variable equally. The one clear 
trend of note is that, for every country in both sets, the R-squared value of the model 
utilizing Trust Index 2 as its dependent variable is higher than that of Trust Index 1. 
While this does not directly reflect on which operationalization of institutional trust most 
accurately captures trust in government, it does at least support the assertion that the 
independent variables used in both models more fully predict Trust Index 2’s broader 
definition of institutional trust.  
 At the same time, the results of the analysis of Trust Index 2 do offer further 
insight into Hypothesis 1. Namely, the seven-question index for traditional social values 
once again remains a consistent determinant of institutional trust, showing a significant 
and positive relationship with institutional trust in all three models at the regional level as 
well as in each country. Much like in the thirteen-country analysis, this consistency is 
akin to that of evaluations of the national economic situation and governmental anti-
corruption efforts. All together then, these findings provide further support for 
Hypothesis 1.  
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INSTITUTIONAL TRUST AND PARTISANSHIP 
Data and Methods 
 Having concluded the above discussion investigating Hypothesis 1 and the impact 
of varying operationalizations of social trust, this section of the paper centers around an 
investigation into Hypothesis 2, largely inspired by the work of Huang, Lee, and Lin 
(2013). As discussed in the literature review, in their paper, Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) 
find that broadly speaking, partisanship, defined as self-identified association with a 
political party, exerts a significant influence on institutional trust; those that identify with 
an opposition party have a significantly lower level of institutional trust. Moreover, 
borrowing a framework from the work of Rothstein and Stolle (2008), Huang, Lee, and 
Lin (2013) divide the institutions they investigate into “partisan” and “neutral” 
institutions; while there is variance from country to country, the study generally finds that 
the impact of partisanship is larger for partisan institutions than neutral institutions.  
 In this section of the paper, I draw heavily on this approach, with a few key 
differences. First, and perhaps most important, I choose to define partisanship in a 
slightly different manner. Within the context of this study, I choose to define partisanship 
not as self-identified affiliation with a party but instead as whether respondents voted for 
the winner or loser of the last major election, as identified by the Asian Barometer 
Survey. This operationalization is functionally akin to the measure that taps into what 
Park (2017), citing the work of Anderson et. al (2005), terms the “winner-loser thesis,” 
predicting that, “… political [institutional] trust should be higher among those who voted 
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for the party in power while lower among those who voted for the opposition,” (pg. 501). 
I choose this operationalization method for two major reasons. One, as discussed in the 
literature review, there are some notable differences between the findings of Park and 
Huang, Lee, and Lin, but due to Park’s limited definition of which institutions matter 
when considering institutional trust, it is impossible to isolate whether said differences 
are due to different operationalizations of ‘partisanship’ or differences in the battery of 
institutions considered. Measuring partisanship in a manner like Park with an expanded 
battery of institutions may help clarify this issue. Two, Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) rely 
on detailed knowledge of the political situation in the countries they investigate in order 
to properly identify and define what, if any, coalitions represent those in power and the 
opposition. By contrast, the variable used to identify winners and losers in the Wave 4 
ABS data set, Q34a, was created by the in-country survey teams. By utilizing their 
definitions of winners and losers, I can rely on their knowledge of the local political 
scene.   
 There are some potential ramifications of this choice to consider. All things 
considered, it seems reasonable to expect relatively high levels of consistency between 
the two measures – we would expect supporters of a given party to vote for said party, 
and opponents to vote against said party. One potential point of concern, however, is 
whether or not voters report their voting behavior accurately. For example, several 
studies focusing on the United States (e.g. Wright 1990; Wright 1992; Carsey and 
Jackson 2001) have found long-running issues with excessively high numbers of voters 
reporting that they had voted for the winner in elections. It may be a concern, then, that 
the number of winners is overstated and some people who voted for a loser or did not 
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vote may be classified as winners. Based on the predictions of Hypothesis 2 and the party 
affiliation partisanship-related findings of Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013), this could 
artificially deflate trust levels among winners.  
I would, however, push back on this concern to some extent. When analyzing the 
mean levels of institutional trust for winners, losers, and non-voters in the eight countries 
I include in the regression analysis below, the expected distribution of trust levels is still 
evident.  
Figure 2.1: Mean Trust Levels by Voter Category 
 
  
 Figure 2.1 displays this point. For all three institution classifications utilized in 
this chapter, winners display the highest mean levels of trust, followed by non-voters, 
followed by losers. Even if some members of the latter category have misreported their 
voting behavior and therefore have been miscategorized, it does not appear to alter the 
fundamental relationship that would be expected.  
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In addition to this difference, as implied using eight countries from the sample, I 
choose to slightly vary the countries included in this analysis. Huang, Lee, and Lin 
(2013) choose to investigate six countries included in Wave 3 of the Asian Barometer 
Survey: South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, The Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. By 
contrast, I choose to include eight of the countries from Wave 4 of the Asian Barometer 
Survey that I used when analyzing Trust Index 2 above: Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, 
The Philippines, Taiwan, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar.  
This difference exists for a few reasons. First, Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) choose 
to utilize a single definition of partisan and neutral institutions across all the countries 
they study, predicated on the assumption that, “… the involvement of national elections, 
in which all major parties compete, is the principal criterion for partisan politics,” (pg. 
10) Based on this assumption, the authors, “… classify the president/prime minister, the 
national government, and parliament as partisan institutions and the courts, civil service, 
the military, the police, and the election commission as neutral institutions,” (Huang, Lee, 
and Lin 2013, pg. 10). Moreover, they exclude newspapers, television, and NGOs as 
neither partisan nor neutral institutions, and political parties and local government 
because they are, “… not unique nationally, and respondents of the ABS may have been 
referring to different entities,” (Huang, Lee, and Lin 2013, pg. 10).  Broadly speaking, I 
believe these classifications to be reasonable, and I mirror them in my analysis in this 
chapter. Unfortunately, questions about the election commission were not asked in 
Indonesia in Wave 4 of the ABS, precluding its inclusion, and a similar lack prevents the 
inclusion of China or Singapore.  
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Excluding Indonesia, China, and Singapore, the remaining sample consists of ten 
countries. However, there are some peculiarities with the winner and loser data at the 
country level that are a potential cause for concern.  
Table 2.1: Distribution of Winners, Losers, and Non-Voters  
 
WinnerLoserAggregate Total Total N Valid 
%  
Non-Voter Winner Loser 
   
Japan 199 396 325 920 1081 85.11 
Hong Kong 128 85 114 327 1217 26.87 
Korea 171 491 295 957 1200 79.75 
Mongolia 133 702 338 1173 1228 95.52 
Philippines 182 694 184 1060 1200 88.33 
Taiwan 260 623 518 1401 1657 84.55 
Thailand 88 186 228 502 1200 41.83 
Cambodia 257 576 283 1116 1200 93.00 
Malaysia 165 506 146 817 1207 67.69 
Myanmar 447 392 403 1242 1620 76.67 
Total 2030 4651 2834 9515 12810 74.28 
 
 Due to the way in which Q34a is coded, only three categories of responses are 
provided: voting for the winner, voting for the loser, or a non-applicable category. This 
means that it is impossible to establish a baseline of non-voters from Q34a alone; it is 
impossible to know whether the non-applicable category refers to a respondent not 
voting, voting but refusing to disclose who they voted for, whether the data for the said 
voter is missing, and so on. Instead, it is necessary to pull data from both Q34a and Q33. 
So, from Q33 I retrieve whether a respondent did not vote in the last election, providing 
the non-voter baseline, and then from Q34a I pull information about whether voters voted 
for the winning or losing party or candidate in the last election. I use this information to 
create the variable WinnerLoserAggregate, responses to which are detailed in Table 2.1, 
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a variable that contains information on respondents who either confirmed they did not 
vote or voters who did vote and provided information on who they voted for. From this 
variable, I create dummy variables for winners and for losers that will be used in the 
regression analysis.  
 The issue, and what necessitates the inclusion of only eight countries out of the 
remaining ten, is that for Hong Kong and Thailand there are notable issues with this data. 
As seen in Table 2.1, in Hong Kong only 26.9% of all respondents from the territory can 
be classified as a winner, a loser, or a non-voter. In Thailand18, only 41.8% of 
respondents can be classified in this way. Comparatively, in every other country, at least 
two-thirds of respondents can be classified.  For this reason, I choose to exclude both 
Hong Kong and Thailand from the analysis, leaving only eight countries.  
 Moving forward, I conduct the analysis in three parts, following the process 
utilized by Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013). In addition to a measure of generalized 
institutional trust, TrustIndexGeneral19, an indexed measure of questions 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 
13, 14, and 18 constructed in the same manner as Trust Index 1 and Trust Index 2 above, 
I also create a measure of institutional trust in partisan institutions, TrustIndexPartisan, 
consisting of only questions 7, 9, and 11, and a measure of institutional trust in neutral 
institutions, TrustIndexNeutral, consisting of questions 8, 12, 13, 14, and 18. In each 
 
18 As an additional note, for respondents from Thailand, 1064 respondents stated that they voted in Q33, 
with 88 saying they did not and 48 either refusing to answer or otherwise not having a coded yes/no answer 
to the question. But, in Q34 and Q34a, 612 respondents are missing, rather than declining to answer or 
falling into some similar category. I cannot account for such a massive discrepancy, one that is not present 
for many other questions in the survey, and this provides further reason to exclude Thailand from the 
analysis in this section.  
19 The institutions included in this measure are: The Executive Office, the National Government, 
Parliament, the Courts, the Civil Service, the Military, the Police, and the Election Commission. The 
former three constitute the partisan trust index measure, and the latter five constitute the neutral trust index 
measure.  
54 
 
case, the minimum response is a 1 and the maximum a 4, ranging from the least amount 
of institutional trust to the maximum. I treat each of these indexes as their own dependent 
variable, and I conduct regression analysis at both the regional level and at the country 
level for each one. The independent variables, outside of the addition of the winner and 
loser dummy variables, remain the same as in Chapter 1.  
Results and Discussion 
 Before diving into the regression analysis, it is beneficial to have a general grasp 
of the relationship between these three measures of institutional trust. Table 2.2 displays 
the mean values for each of the three measures along with the standard error of the mean. 
From this distribution, it is possible to identify some general trends. First, following the 
trends associated with the institutional trust measures in Chapter 1, countries with lower 
Freedom House scores, therefore being considered freer, tend to have lower levels of 
institutional trust across the board. Second, largely consistent with the findings of Huang, 
Lee, and Lin (2013), the mean partisan institutional trust measure is lower than both the 
neutral and general measures of institutional trust in every country except Myanmar.  
In the case of Myanmar, this unique distribution can be better highlighted by 
taking an in-depth look at trust levels in these eight countries for all institutions included 
in the general trust index. For the three partisan institutions (the executive office, the 
national government, and parliament) the mean scores in Myanmar are approximately .2 
to .25 points higher than the regional average. For the five neutral institutions, mean trust 
in the courts and the civil service are .1 to .15 points lower, but the major differences lie 
with trust in the military, approximately .25 points lower, and the police, more than .5 
points on a four-point scale. It is possible these drastically lower levels of trust in two of 
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the five neutral institutions, in combination with above-average trust in partisan 
institutions, create this statistical oddity.  
Table 2.2: Mean Trust Levels by Institution Type 
 
 Moving into the OLS regression analysis, the findings are in many ways 
consistent with the findings and predictions of Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) and support 
Hypothesis 2. Of note, in the previous chapter, I ran the regression analysis with three 
models. But, because this chapter concerns both regional and country-level analysis for 
three different dependent variables, I choose to simply run one model for each case. This 
model includes all the independent variables including demographic controls, making the 
models functionally like Model 3 in the previous chapter outside of the addition of the 
winner and loser dummy variables.  
 Beginning with the general institutional trust model, at the regional level all 
variables except for the female dummy variable, income quintiles, and organizational 
membership reach significance at the 95% confidence level. It should be noted, however, 
that while organizational membership does not strictly meet this definition of 
significance, its associated p-value is .059. Much like in Chapter 1, evaluations of the 
national economic situation and anti-corruption efforts exert significant, positive 
TrustIndexPartisan TrustIndexNeutral TrustIndexGeneral
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Freedom House
Japan 2.17 0.02 2.66 0.02 2.48 0.02 2
Korea 2.1 0.02 2.41 0.02 2.29 0.01 5
Mongolia 2.3 0.02 2.53 0.01 2.44 0.01 4
Philippines 2.46 0.02 2.6 0.02 2.54 0.02 6
Taiwan 2.07 0.01 2.39 0.01 2.27 0.01 3
Cambodia 2.71 0.02 2.77 0.02 2.74 0.02 11
Malaysia 2.93 0.02 2.99 0.02 2.97 0.02 8
Myanmar 2.65 0.02 2.37 0.02 2.47 0.02 11
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influences in institutional trust, and the standardized coefficients for these two variables 
are by far the largest in the model. Social trust, traditional social values, the Freedom 
House score, and evaluations of family economic situation all have a significant and 
positive relationship with institutional trust, but the standardized coefficients are 
comparatively low. Interestingly, these initial results do seem to further support the 
predictions of Hypothesis 1; even when controlling for partisanship, higher levels of 
traditional social values are correlated with higher levels of institutional trust. Higher 
levels of education do result in a significantly lower level of institutional trust, but the 
magnitude of this relationship is relatively small. Finally, moving on to the winner and 
loser dummy variables, these initial findings provide support for Hypothesis 2. Compared 
to non-voters, voting for the winning party in the last election results in a significant and 
positive change in general institutional trust at the regional level, and voting for the 
losing party results in a significant decrease in institutional trust.  
Table 2.3: General Institutional Trust Regional-Level OLS Regression 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
  
1 (Constant) 1.091 0.049   22.32 0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.162 0.007 0.256 23.263 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.041 0.008 0.054 5.193 0 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.18 0.007 0.249 24.492 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.059 0.014 0.043 4.299 0  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.022 0.012 0.019 1.89 0.059 
 
Female 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.743 0.458  
Traditionalism Index 0.113 0.013 0.099 9.056 0  
Freedom House Score 0.011 0.002 0.058 4.902 0  
Education -0.019 0.003 -0.08 -6.96 0  
Income Quintiles 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.475 0.635  
Winner Dummy 0.12 0.015 0.103 7.904 0  
Loser Dummy -0.084 0.017 -0.065 -5.044 0 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .541a 0.292 0.291 0.49288 
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 Moving onto general institutional trust at the country level20, there is a notable 
amount of variance in the significance of factors from country to country. Much of this 
variance can be attributed to the various demographic controls, but more pertinent to this 
discussion is the variance in the significance of the winner and loser dummy variables, 
social trust, organizational membership, and traditional social values. Compared to the 
regional model, organizational membership is significant and positively associated with 
institutional trust in South Korea, Mongolia, and Myanmar. Social trust fails to reach 
significance in Mongolia and Cambodia. Considering that these two variables displayed 
similar levels of variance in significance in the previous chapter, such trends are not 
inherently surprising. However, for the first time, traditional social values fail to reach 
significance in a model – in Myanmar, the associated p-value is only .082. Finally, the 
winner and loser dummy variables are somewhat erratic. In the case of the former, the 
winner dummy variable is not significant in Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and 
Myanmar. In the case of the latter, the loser dummy variable fails to reach significance in 
Japan, Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Myanmar. These findings do not entirely 
discredit Hypothesis 2 as one might expect the influence of voting for the winning or 
losing party to be diluted in a trust measure that includes both partisan and non-partisan 
institutions, but it does at least begin to suggest the impact of such effects is not even 
across all countries, much as Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) find in their study, and it raises 
the possibility that the loss in trust from voting for a loser is less noticeable than the 
increase in trust from voting for the winner.  
 
20 See Appendix 2.1 for the country level regression models.  
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 Keeping these findings in mind, I then move onto the analysis of the partisan trust 
index. At the regional level, only the female and income quintile variables fail to reach 
significance, and there is no variation in the direction of the significant relationships 
between the general and partisan models. The magnitude of the impact of the winner and 
loser variables is also higher for the partisan trust index than the general trust index, 
which suggests that the scale of the impact for voting for the winner or loser may be 
larger for partisan institutions. Like the general trust index, there is still noticeable 
variation in terms of the significance of determinants between countries21. Organizational 
membership fails to reach significance in Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Cambodia, and 
Malaysia. Social trust fails to reach significance at the 95% confidence level in Mongolia, 
the Philippines (with a p-value of .061), Taiwan, and Cambodia. Again, traditional social 
values fail to reach significance in one country, but in this case, it is Mongolia, not 
Myanmar. While this does not discredit the notion that, in many cases, traditional social 
values are an important determinant of institutional trust, the fact that evaluations of 
national economic performance and anti-corruption continue to remain significant in 
every model highlights their relative consistency compared to other determinants.  
 
 
 
 
 
21 See Appendix 2.2 for the country level regression models.  
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Table 2.4: Partisan Institutional Trust Regional-Level OLS Regression 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
  
1 (Constant) 0.547 0.056   9.829 0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.196 0.008 0.261 24.702 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.036 0.009 0.04 3.977 0 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.19 0.008 0.222 22.764 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.058 0.016 0.035 3.707 0  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.05 0.013 0.036 3.815 0 
 
Female 0.013 0.013 0.009 1.014 0.311  
Traditionalism Index 0.151 0.014 0.111 10.615 0  
Freedom House Score 0.043 0.002 0.197 17.374 0  
Education -0.017 0.003 -0.062 -5.611 0  
Income Quintiles 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.487 0.626  
Winner Dummy 0.152 0.017 0.109 8.769 0  
Loser Dummy -0.128 0.019 -0.083 -6.739 0 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .596a 0.355 0.354 0.55818 
 
Finally, the winner dummy variable fails to reach significance in the Philippines 
and Myanmar, and the loser dummy variable fails to reach significance in Mongolia, 
Taiwan (p-value .054), and Myanmar. Again, the inconsistency of the winner and loser 
variables in certain countries further supports the assertion that the impact of partisanship 
on institutional trust is, while a factor, one that cannot be generalized to every country. 
But both the winner and loser variables reach significance in a larger number of countries 
for the partisan institutions, and the direction of the relationship for the countries where 
these measures reach significance is in line with expectations, so in many ways, these 
findings still provide support for Hypothesis 2.  
 Finally, I repeat the above process for the neutral trust index. At the regional 
level, the results are quite like those of the general trust index, with organizational 
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membership, the female dummy variable, and income quintiles not reaching significance 
at the 95% confidence level. While these results are quite similar, an important difference 
is that the R Square value for the neutral trust index is notably smaller at .199 than the 
general trust index, .292, or the partisan trust index, .355. Similarly, for each country the 
R Square value of the neutral trust index is lower than that of the partisan trust index. 
This, in combination with the fact that the magnitude of the coefficients for the winner 
and loser variables in the neutral trust index are the smallest out of all three regional 
models, suggests that the winner and loser variables in particular, and the entirety of the 
independent variables tested in general, are less able to explain variance in institutional 
trust for these neutral institutions.  
Table 2.5: Neutral Institutional Trust Regional-Level OLS Regression 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
  
1 (Constant) 1.421 0.054   26.258 0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.143 0.008 0.217 18.546 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.044 0.009 0.056 5.02 0 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.172 0.008 0.229 21.153 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.059 0.015 0.041 3.867 0  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.007 0.013 0.005 0.511 0.61 
 
Female 0.006 0.013 0.005 0.481 0.631  
Traditionalism Index 0.092 0.014 0.078 6.663 0  
Freedom House Score -0.009 0.002 -0.047 -3.755 0  
Education -0.02 0.003 -0.082 -6.698 0  
Income Quintiles 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.454 0.65  
Winner Dummy 0.098 0.017 0.081 5.836 0  
Loser Dummy -0.063 0.018 -0.047 -3.407 0.001 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .446a 0.199 0.198 0.54557 
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 At the country level22, the neutral institutions again display a somewhat similar 
pattern to the one observable in the prior two models, inasmuch as many of the variables 
display a wide variance in significance from country to country. Interestingly, 
organizational membership fairs better for these institutions, failing to reach significance 
only in the Philippines, Cambodia, and Malaysia. Social trust fails to reach significance 
in Mongolia, Cambodia (p-value .078), and Myanmar (p-value .078), and once more, 
traditional social values fail to reach significance in Myanmar. The variables whose 
performance most suffer in this model, however, are the winner and loser variables. The 
winner variable fails to reach significance in South Korea, Mongolia, the Philippines, 
Taiwan, Cambodia, and Myanmar, and the loser variable fails to reach significance in 
Japan, Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Myanmar23. Evaluations of national 
economic performance and governmental anti-corruption efforts are still consistently 
significant, positive determinants of institutional trust in every country, and evaluations 
of family economic situation pass the 95% confidence interval in all but South Korea and 
Myanmar.  
What to make of these findings? Before diving into how these findings shape the 
understanding of Hypothesis 2, it is necessary to revisit a point made in the literature 
review, the way in which the impact of partisanship in Mongolia serves as an example of 
potential issues with a limited definition of which institutions matter when creating a 
 
22 See Appendix 2.3 for the country level regression models.  
23 Myanmar is very much an oddity in terms of this analysis, with the winner and loser variables failing to 
reach significance in every single model. While this may, in fact, be accurate, it is important to note that, as 
detailed by sources like The Economist (2015) that at the time the Wave 4 ABS was being conducted in 
Myanmar, the country was in a run-up to its first comparatively free and fair general election in decades, 
coming on the tail-end of five years of military-approved reforms. Further analysis, perhaps when a fifth 
wave of the ABS survey is released, will likely be necessary to determine whether these findings are a fluke 
or a pattern.  
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measure of institutional trust. Unfortunately, these results do not provide a 
comprehensive conclusion on whether it was Park’s (2017) choice of a limited definition 
of institutional trust, only considering parliament and national government, that led to the 
divergence in findings between his work and the work of Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013). As 
I found, only in the case of partisan institutions does voting for the winner have a 
significant, positive impact on institutional trust in Mongolia. But, trust in parliament and 
national government makes up two-thirds of this measure, so it is difficult to say with 
certainty that it was the institutions chosen rather than changes in the political situation in 
Mongolia that explain such variance. What the expanded battery of institutions in 
combination with dividing the analysis into partisan and neutral institutions does offer, 
however, is the ability to concretely state that, at any given period, partisanship does or 
does not significantly impact trust in a wider set of institutions.  
More broadly, the collective impression is at least somewhat supportive of 
Hypothesis 2. At the regional level, for each model the winner and loser dummy variables 
have significant impacts on institutional trust, positive for the case of the winner variable 
and negative for the loser variable. This supports the assertion that, as compared to non-
voters, those who vote for the winner of the most recent election display higher levels of 
institutional trust, not only in partisan institutions but also in institutions more broadly, 
and losers display lower levels. It is the country-level results that require conditioning the 
acceptance of Hypothesis 2 to some extent.  
Certainly, the winner and loser dummy variables perform at different levels 
depending on whether the model uses a more holistic index of institutional trust or a 
partisan/non-partisan measure. That the best performance is found in the partisan model, 
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and the worst the neutral model, suggests that on aggregate the impact of partisanship on 
trust in neutral institutions is less than on trust in partisan institutions and is in line with 
Hypothesis 2 and the findings of Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013). That these broad 
relationships hold when controlling for a wider range of factors than those tested by 
Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) provides further support to their argument that partisanship is 
an important determinant to test, one that as of yet is underrepresented in the wider 
literature on institutional trust. At the same time, the wide variance in country-level 
results should serve as something of a cautionary note. It does not seem reasonable to 
suggest that partisanship is a sweeping force that influences institutional trust equally in 
every location as the regional-level results might initially indicate. Instead, it is likely that 
the causal link between partisanship and institutional trust is case-specific, and attempts 
to explain such a link will likely necessitate in-depth analysis of time-sensitive situations 
in any given location, much as Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) do when attempting to 
explain the variance in results they find in their study.  
Finally, with the emphasis that this study places on the roles of traditional social 
values and partisanship, I re-run the above analysis with a two-level OLS regression 
model, the first level including all variables except for traditional social values and the 
second model also including traditional social values. If, for example, there were a 
number of cases in which the inclusion of traditional social values altered the significance 
of the winner or loser variables, it may suggest some form of interaction between these 
variables24. However, this does not appear to be the case. For both the partisan and 
general trust indexes, the inclusion of traditional social values in no way influences the 
 
24 Because there is no meaningful difference in results, the models are not included in this paper.  
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significance of the winner or loser variables at either the regional-level or the country-
level. In the case of the neutral trust index, such an effect is only found in South Korea, 
although in this case the loser dummy variable actually reaches significance only after 
traditional social values is accounted for. For the most part, then, there appears to be no 
unique relationship between partisanship and traditional social values.  
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CONCLUSION 
 Taking a holistic look at the findings of this study, in many ways they serve as 
validations of observable trends in the wider literature. At the same time, this study also 
provides several conclusions that serve to further advance the discussion on institutional 
trust in East and Southeast Asia while providing meaningful avenues of future research.  
 First, in a broad sense, this project provides further insight into the debate over 
whether institutional or cultural factors best explain trends in institutional trust. The 
analysis in this paper was prefaced by the claims of authors (e.g. Wong, Wan, and Hsiao 
2011; Wang 2013; Park 2017) about the relative superiority or consistency of the 
institutional approach to institutional trust. Within that discussion, I asserted, based on 
prior literature, that the latter portion of the argument seems a more reasonable claim than 
the former, and the results of this study support that assertion. Consistency is, in fact, the 
hallmark of the variables reflective of the institutional approach like evaluations of the 
national economic situation and governmental anti-corruption efforts. In every single 
model included in this paper, these two variables have a significant, positive impact on 
institutional trust. Moreover, the standardized coefficients associated with these variables 
suggest that the magnitude of their impact is the largest of any tested variable.  
 The consistency of these two variables, and therefore the comparatively higher 
consistency of the institutional approach, is further highlighted by the lack of consistency 
displayed by the variables attempting to tap into social capital. For both social trust and 
organizational membership, there is a much greater level of variation in significance from 
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model to model and from country to country. This is, admittedly, not surprising given the 
inconsistent conclusions the wider literature reaches about these variables, but the fact 
that this inconsistently remains apparent when controlling for a wider number of 
variables than much of the literature does lend further credence to voices that downplay 
the role of social capital in shaping institutional trust in East and Southeast Asia. 
Moreover, there appears to be only marginal support for the role that different 
operationalizations of social trust play in explaining some of this variance. While 
utilizing an alternative operationalization of social trust on the same data set, the general 
process modeled off the work of Mujani and Liddle (2013), does alter the significance of 
social trust in a subset of the countries studied, it is not a comprehensive explanation. As 
such, it seems reasonable to largely accept the literature’s preference for the institutional 
approach.  
 At the same time, there are some findings that prompt pushback on a blanket 
assertion that the institutional approach is clearly superior to the cultural approach as 
compared to acknowledging that the cultural approach does provide some value. In 
particular, the conclusions that we can draw about traditional social values from this 
study reflect positively on the cultural approach. Whereas social trust and organizational 
membership fail to reach a significant level of certainty in many of the models tested, 
traditional social values almost always have a significant, positive impact on institutional 
trust. Behind evaluations of the national economic situation and governmental anti-
corruption efforts, traditional social values are actually the most consistent variable tested 
in the entire study. While the wider literature on the topic of traditionalism is much more 
mixed, because the results of this study were found using the same operationalization but 
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a newer set of data than Ikeda (2013), it seems reasonable to conclude that much of the 
discrepancy in the conclusions drawn about traditional social values are due to issues 
with operationalization rather than intrinsic issues that might suggest a lack of a 
relationship between traditional social values and institutional trust.  
 More broadly, these findings offer a mixed picture on the long-term prospects of 
institutional trust in the region. Considering their findings on partisanship, Huang, Lee, 
and Lin (2013) take a relatively negative tact, arguing that, “… the implications of our 
findings seem pessimistic. If institutional trust is subject to partisan projection, there is a 
limit to what a democratic government can do to improve trust by improving 
governance,” (pg. 67). To some extent, these same fears exist with the findings in this 
study. Partisanship does seem to play a role in shaping levels of trust in the region. At the 
same time, this relationship does not hold true for each country or each type of 
institution, and even in those it does the magnitude of this relationship is smaller than 
many other variables. Moreover, the two most consistent and influential determinants of 
institutional trust, evaluations of the national economic situation and perceptions of anti-
corruption efforts, are much more closely associated with governmental performance. 
Certainly, there are factors outside the influence of governments that can negatively 
impact economic growth, but those concerned about increasing levels of institutional trust 
should take heart in the fact that institutional trust does still appear to be tied closely to 
good governance. What might be more concerning in the long run is the relationship 
between traditional social values and institutional trust. If one assumes that these 
traditional values will decay over time, this presents a source of further decline in 
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institutional trust that may be difficult for governments to address. More research is likely 
necessary to determine if such a trend exists.  
 This study also provides additional avenues for further research. First, in line with 
the necessity of further research tracking the level of traditional social values in the 
region, traditional social values should feature much more prominently in any future 
research on institutional trust in East and Southeast Asia. At the same time, this study 
utilizes a relatively straightforward operationalization of traditional social values. It 
would likely be worthwhile to disaggregate traditional social values further, as Zhai 
(2016) does when disaggregating traditional social values in China into family, social, 
and political values. There are also several variables discussed in the literature review 
that were, unfortunately, not included in this study that warrant further testing. These 
include testing to see to what extent the electoral systems utilized influence levels of 
institutional trust, the extent to which the proportionality of electoral outcomes influences 
institutional trust, and whether a more comprehensive definition of media consumption 
would lead to more consistent conclusions about the impact of the variable than currently 
exist in the wider literature and address the discrepancies about the variable that exist 
between the East Asian and African literature on trust. The more expansive models 
utilized in this study are a good first step, but further progress can be made on uniformly 
testing competing explanations about the determinants of institutional trust within any 
single study.  
 Additionally, there are some methodological aspects utilized in this project that 
either warrant further study or should be more commonly incorporated in the literature on 
the topic. The differences in results between partisan and neutral institutions explored in 
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Chapter 2 lend further credence to the assertion made by Huang, Lee, and Lin (2013) that 
the relationship between partisanship and institutional trust needs to be accounted for in 
more studies. At the same time, it was not only the relationship between partisanship and 
institutional trust that varied when looking at partisan versus neutral institutions. This 
suggests that, regardless of whether partisanship is being investigated in a study, there is 
value in carving out this distinction between types of institutions. Of course, the 
differences in the significance of other determinants between partisan and neutral 
institutions may not be linked to their partisan or non-partisan nature, but at the very least 
this point supports my earlier claim that studies should be taking into account a greater 
number of institutions when defining institutional trust; a measure looking at views for 
only one or two institutions simply can’t pick up any such potential variation.  
 Altogether, this study has provided valuable insights on both the institutional and 
cultural approaches to institutional trust. It has confirmed the importance of testing both 
partisanship and traditional social values as determinants of institutional trust in East and 
Southeast Asia. And, more broadly, it has explored some of the implications of the 
varying methodologies that have been used in the wider literature while providing some 
suggestions on areas where progress can be made on standardizing approaches. Issues of 
institutional trust will likely maintain their importance in the years to come, and further 
research, both on the regional and at the country level, will be necessary to continue to 
improve our understanding of the topic.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1.1: Trust Index 1 Country-Level Regression Models 
JAPAN 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.084 0.142    
National Economic Evaluations 0.095*** 0.019 0.169  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.103*** 0.022 0.166  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.175*** 0.021 0.278  
Social Trust Dummy 0.089** 0.033 0.088  
Organizational Membership 0.061 0.035 0.057  
Traditionalism Index 0.14*** 0.038 0.123  
Female -0.086** 0.031 -0.091  
Education 0.01 0.01 0.036  
Income Quintiles -0.009 0.012 -0.028 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
3 .485c 0.235 0.226 0.41749   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
HONG KONG 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 0.93 0.132    
National Economic Evaluations 0.166*** 0.019 0.279  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.007 0.024 0.009  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.116*** 0.022 0.177  
Social Trust Dummy 0.086** 0.029 0.092  
Organizational Membership 0.146** 0.046 0.101  
Traditionalism Index 0.342*** 0.037 0.308  
Female -0.009 0.029 -0.01  
Education -0.007 0.006 -0.035  
Income Quintiles -0.016 0.01 -0.052 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
3 .547c 0.3 0.291 0.39238   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
KOREA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.154 0.13    
National Economic Evaluations 0.103*** 0.02 0.155  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.041 0.023 0.054  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.128*** 0.021 0.174  
Social Trust Dummy 0.132*** 0.03 0.127  
Organizational Membership 0.108*** 0.029 0.108 
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Traditionalism Index 0.147*** 0.03 0.142  
Female 0.005 0.028 0.005  
Education -0.009 0.009 -0.028  
Income Quintiles 0.007 0.012 0.017 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
3 .393c 0.155 0.148 0.45985   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
CHINA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.69 0.112    
National Economic Evaluations 0.095*** 0.01 0.216  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.005 0.014 0.009  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.125*** 0.016 0.171  
Social Trust Dummy 0.107*** 0.019 0.12  
Organizational Membership 0.017 0.073 0.005  
Traditionalism Index 0.258*** 0.032 0.181  
Female -0.038* 0.019 -0.043  
Education -0.009* 0.004 -0.054  
Income Quintiles -0.018* 0.008 -0.056 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
3 .433c 0.188 0.184 0.40057   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
MONGOLIA 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.408 0.14    
National Economic Evaluations 0.128*** 0.02 0.197  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.053* 0.022 0.073  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.084*** 0.019 0.133  
Social Trust Dummy 0.022 0.037 0.018  
Organizational Membership 0.105** 0.032 0.099  
Traditionalism Index 0.104** 0.033 0.095  
Female -0.008 0.03 -0.008  
Education -0.002 0.007 -0.009  
Income Quintiles 0.002 0.016 0.004 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
3 .310c 0.096 0.088 0.48385   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
PHILIPPINES 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.283 0.143    
National Economic Evaluations 0.139*** 0.018 0.221  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.042* 0.02 0.061 
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Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.105*** 0.019 0.152  
Social Trust Dummy 0.162** 0.057 0.078  
Organizational Membership 0.043 0.032 0.037  
Traditionalism Index 0.181*** 0.036 0.136  
Female -0.004 0.031 -0.004  
Education -0.023** 0.007 -0.093  
Income Quintiles -0.051** 0.016 -0.097 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
3 .396c 0.157 0.15 0.52298   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
TAIWAN 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.074 0.123    
National Economic Evaluations 0.135*** 0.013 0.26  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.052** 0.016 0.086  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.156*** 0.016 0.241  
Social Trust Dummy 0.063* 0.026 0.063  
Organizational Membership 0.065** 0.024 0.065  
Traditionalism Index 0.129*** 0.037 0.091  
Female -0.001 0.024 -0.001  
Education -0.005 0.006 -0.022  
Income Quintiles -0.032** 0.011 -0.08 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
3 .469c 0.22 0.215 0.44443   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
THAILAND 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.586 0.174    
National Economic Evaluations 0.096*** 0.023 0.164  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.005 0.032 0.007  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.085*** 0.024 0.127  
Social Trust Dummy 0.15*** 0.04 0.136  
Organizational Membership 0.146*** 0.039 0.133  
Traditionalism Index 0.222*** 0.043 0.181  
Female -0.06 0.037 -0.056  
Education -0.027** 0.008 -0.117  
Income Quintiles 0.002 0.019 0.005 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
3 .423c 0.179 0.168 0.48238   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
INDONESIA 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.29 0.15    
National Economic Evaluations 0.125*** 0.018 0.204 
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Family Economic Evaluations 0.039 0.02 0.058  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.14*** 0.023 0.172  
Social Trust Dummy 0.139*** 0.034 0.112  
Organizational Membership 0.089 0.055 0.045  
Traditionalism Index 0.144*** 0.035 0.114  
Female 0.028 0.028 0.028  
Education -0.03*** 0.007 -0.136  
Income Quintiles 0.06*** 0.012 0.157 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
3 .449c 0.201 0.195 0.45663   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
SINGAPORE 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.171 0.201    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.103** 0.03 0.145 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.057 0.031 0.08 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.199*** 0.033 0.238  
Social Trust Dummy 0.154** 0.048 0.125  
Organizational Membership -0.077 0.042 -0.07  
Traditionalism Index 0.172*** 0.04 0.175  
Female 0.024 0.041 0.023  
Education 0.005 0.01 0.022  
Income Quintiles 0.025 0.019 0.054 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .434c 0.188 0.175 0.48336   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
CAMBODIA 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 0.753 0.144    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.212 *** 0.02 0.286 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.053 * 0.023 0.06 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.221 *** 0.02 0.292  
Social Trust Dummy 0.035 0.043 0.02  
Organizational Membership -0.022 0.039 -0.014  
Traditionalism Index 0.219 *** 0.036 0.152  
Female 0.129 *** 0.03 0.109  
Education -0.019** 0.007 -0.076  
Income Quintiles -0.032* 0.014 -0.06 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .549c 0.301 0.296 0.49492   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
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MALAYSIA 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.026 0.124    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.188 *** 0.018 0.288 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.09 *** 0.021 0.114 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.192 *** 0.019 0.258  
Social Trust Dummy 0.149 ** 0.051 0.07  
Organizational Membership 0.025 0.032 0.018  
Traditionalism Index 0.241 *** 0.031 0.192  
Female -0.025 0.029 -0.021  
Education -0.023** 0.007 -0.083  
Income Quintiles -0.05*** 0.013 -0.101 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .611c 0.373 0.368 0.47187   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
MYANMAR 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 0.705 0.165    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.115 *** 0.025 0.13 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.037 0.03 0.035 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.319*** 0.021 0.404  
Social Trust Dummy 0.177*** 0.046 0.099  
Organizational Membership 0.155*** 0.037 0.108  
Traditionalism Index 0.121** 0.038 0.083  
Female 0.011 0.035 0.008  
Education -0.027*** 0.007 -0.098  
Income Quintiles -0.017 0.021 -0.022 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .532c 0.283 0.277 0.57966   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
Appendix 1.2: 13-Trust Index 1 Country-Level Regression with Social Trust Index 
JAPAN 
     
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
3 (Constant) 1.027 0.139 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.09 0.019 0.161 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.099 0.022 0.158 0  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.162 0.021 0.258 0  
Organizational Membership 0.044 0.034 0.041 0.199  
Social Trust Index 0.073 0.015 0.165 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.133 0.037 0.116 0  
Female -0.085 0.031 -0.09 0.005  
Education 0.008 0.01 0.029 0.411  
Income Quintiles -0.013 0.012 -0.039 0.282 
Model Summary 
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Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .503c 0.253 0.244 0.41166 
 
 
HONG KONG 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
3 (Constant) 0.91 0.131 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.157 0.019 0.263 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.016 0.024 0.021 0.505  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.099 0.022 0.151 0  
Organizational Membership 0.146 0.045 0.101 0.001  
Social Trust Index 0.045 0.013 0.112 0.001  
Traditionalism Index 0.339 0.037 0.304 0  
Female -0.011 0.029 -0.012 0.694  
Education -0.007 0.006 -0.035 0.269  
Income Quintiles -0.018 0.01 -0.057 0.068 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .549c 0.302 0.294 0.39242 
 
 
KOREA 
     
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
3 (Constant) 1.196 0.127 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.102 0.019 0.154 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.029 0.022 0.038 0.194  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.12 0.021 0.163 0  
Organizational Membership 0.099 0.028 0.099 0  
Social Trust Index 0.072 0.011 0.181 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.133 0.029 0.128 0  
Female -0.005 0.028 -0.005 0.845  
Education -0.018 0.009 -0.062 0.045  
Income Quintiles 0.012 0.012 0.03 0.333 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .412c 0.17 0.163 0.45641 
 
 
CHINA 
     
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
3 (Constant) 1.583 0.11 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.093 0.01 0.209 0  
Family Economic Evaluations -0.004 0.013 -0.006 0.785  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.119 0.016 0.16 0  
Organizational Membership 0.016 0.071 0.005 0.818  
Social Trust Index 0.065 0.009 0.155 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.267 0.031 0.187 0  
Female -0.031 0.019 -0.035 0.1 
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Education -0.01 0.004 -0.062 0.01  
Income Quintiles -0.016 0.008 -0.051 0.031 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .439c 0.193 0.189 0.40288 
 
 
MONGOLIA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
3 (Constant) 1.311 0.14 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.12 0.019 0.184 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.056 0.022 0.078 0.01  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.079 0.018 0.125 0  
Organizational Membership 0.087 0.031 0.083 0.005  
Social Trust Index 0.057 0.014 0.116 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.091 0.032 0.083 0.005  
Female -0.003 0.029 -0.002 0.932  
Education -0.002 0.007 -0.011 0.743  
Income Quintiles 0.013 0.016 0.026 0.42 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .325c 0.106 0.098 0.4804 
 
 
THE PHILIPPINES 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
3 (Constant) 1.237 0.139 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.13 0.018 0.208 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.034 0.019 0.05 0.072  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.089 0.018 0.13 0  
Organizational Membership 0.035 0.031 0.03 0.259  
Social Trust Index 0.112 0.014 0.22 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.156 0.036 0.118 0  
Female 0.013 0.03 0.011 0.672  
Education -0.021 0.007 -0.085 0.003  
Income Quintiles -0.05 0.015 -0.094 0.001 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .444c 0.197 0.191 0.51021 
 
 
TAIWAN 
     
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
3 (Constant) 1.021 0.119 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.13 0.013 0.253 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.045 0.016 0.074 0.005 
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Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.15 0.016 0.233 0  
Organizational Membership 0.054 0.024 0.053 0.024  
Social Trust Index 0.07 0.01 0.175 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.118 0.036 0.084 0.001  
Female -0.001 0.023 -0.001 0.951  
Education -0.007 0.006 -0.033 0.249  
Income Quintiles -0.037 0.011 -0.092 0.001 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .496c 0.246 0.241 0.43645 
 
 
THAILAND 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
3 (Constant) 1.426 0.161 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.087 0.022 0.15 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.013 0.029 0.016 0.659  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.07 0.022 0.105 0.002  
Organizational Membership 0.109 0.037 0.1 0.003  
Social Trust Index 0.121 0.016 0.27 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.21 0.041 0.173 0  
Female -0.047 0.035 -0.045 0.173  
Education -0.021 0.008 -0.092 0.008  
Income Quintiles -0.003 0.018 -0.006 0.858 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .487c 0.237 0.228 0.46616 
 
 
INDONESIA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
3 (Constant) 1.192 0.15 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.119 0.018 0.195 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.034 0.02 0.05 0.092  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.138 0.022 0.172 0  
Organizational Membership 0.097 0.054 0.049 0.073  
Social Trust Index 0.068 0.014 0.137 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.137 0.035 0.109 0  
Female 0.04 0.028 0.04 0.145  
Education -0.03 0.007 -0.137 0  
Income Quintiles 0.058 0.012 0.155 0 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .454c 0.206 0.199 0.45369 
 
 
SINGAPORE 
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Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
3 (Constant) 1.093 0.199 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.11 0.03 0.153 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.041 0.03 0.058 0.177  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.2 0.032 0.239 0  
Organizational Membership -0.056 0.042 -0.051 0.179  
Social Trust Index 0.053 0.016 0.125 0.001  
Traditionalism Index 0.184 0.04 0.185 0  
Female 0.028 0.041 0.027 0.487  
Education 0.002 0.01 0.009 0.822  
Income Quintiles 0.031 0.019 0.067 0.105 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .438c 0.192 0.179 0.48426 
 
 
CAMBODIA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
3 (Constant) 0.695 0.142 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.211 0.019 0.284 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.037 0.023 0.043 0.102  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.213 0.019 0.282 0  
Organizational Membership -0.005 0.038 -0.003 0.888  
Social Trust Index 0.088 0.015 0.146 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.2 0.036 0.139 0  
Female 0.145 0.03 0.123 0  
Education -0.021 0.007 -0.084 0.002  
Income Quintiles -0.028 0.014 -0.051 0.048 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .567c 0.321 0.316 0.48783 
 
 
MALAYSIA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
3 (Constant) 0.993 0.124 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.189 0.018 0.289 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.083 0.021 0.105 0  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.189 0.019 0.255 0  
Organizational Membership 0.023 0.032 0.017 0.479  
Social Trust Index 0.062 0.014 0.109 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.224 0.031 0.179 0  
Female -0.01 0.029 -0.008 0.734  
Education -0.025 0.007 -0.091 0.001  
Income Quintiles -0.049 0.013 -0.1 0 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
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3 .615c 0.378 0.373 0.46946 
 
 
MYANMAR 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
  
B Std. Error Beta 
 
3 (Constant) 0.71 0.16 
 
0  
National Economic Evaluations 0.111 0.024 0.125 0  
Family Economic Evaluations 0.023 0.029 0.021 0.435  
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.304 0.02 0.385 0  
Organizational Membership 0.144 0.036 0.1 0  
Social Trust Index 0.103 0.012 0.21 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.097 0.037 0.067 0.009  
Female 0.019 0.034 0.014 0.578  
Education -0.029 0.007 -0.104 0  
Income Quintiles -0.012 0.021 -0.016 0.55 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .562c 0.316 0.31 0.56618 
 
 
Appendix 1.3: Trust Index 2 Country-Level Regression Models 
JAPAN 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.075 0.131    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.102*** 0.018 0.19 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.093*** 0.02 0.158 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.174*** 0.019 0.292  
Social Trust Dummy 0.078* 0.031 0.081  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.063 0.032 0.061 
 
Traditionalism Index 0.163*** 0.035 0.151  
Female -0.093** 0.029 -0.104  
Education 0.002 0.009 0.006  
Income Quintiles -0.01 0.011 -0.032 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .514c 0.264 0.255 0.38745   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
KOREA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.165 0.122    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.099*** 0.018 0.157 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.047* 0.021 0.066 
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Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.123*** 0.02 0.175  
Social Trust Dummy 0.149*** 0.028 0.151  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.106*** 0.027 0.111 
 
Traditionalism Index 0.157*** 0.028 0.158  
Female 0.01 0.026 0.011  
Education -0.015 0.009 -0.052  
Income Quintiles 0.008 0.012 0.021 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .425c 0.181 0.174 0.43078   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
MONGOLIA 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.351 0.128    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.153*** 0.018 0.253 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.059** 0.02 0.087 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.078*** 0.017 0.133  
Social Trust Dummy 0.008 0.033 0.007  
Organizational Membership 0.102*** 0.029 0.103  
Traditionalism Index 0.092** 0.03 0.09  
Female -0.009 0.027 -0.01  
Education -0.002 0.006 -0.009  
Income Quintiles -0.011 0.015 -0.025 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .358c 0.128 0.121 0.44168   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
PHILIPPINES 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.264 0.131    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.154 *** 0.017 0.262 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.036* 0.018 0.056 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.108*** 0.017 0.169  
Social Trust Dummy 0.191*** 0.052 0.099  
Organizational Membership 0.04 0.029 0.037  
Traditionalism Index 0.173*** 0.033 0.14  
Female 0.017 0.028 0.016  
Education -0.019** 0.007 -0.082  
Income Quintiles -0.059*** 0.014 -0.12 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .443c 0.197 0.19 0.47705   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
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TAIWAN 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.002 0.109    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.13*** 0.012 0.272 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.059*** 0.014 0.107 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.158*** 0.014 0.265  
Social Trust Dummy 0.069** 0.023 0.075  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.065** 0.022 0.07 
 
Traditionalism Index 0.155*** 0.033 0.119  
Female -0.012 0.021 -0.013  
Education -0.008 0.006 -0.04  
Income Quintiles -0.036*** 0.01 -0.098 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .519c 0.269 0.265 0.39708   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
THAILAND 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 1.593 0.164    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.108*** 0.022 0.193 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.006 0.03 0.007 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.079*** 0.022 0.125  
Social Trust Dummy 0.105** 0.038 0.1  
Organizational Membership 0.153*** 0.037 0.147  
Traditionalism Index 0.21*** 0.041 0.18  
Female -0.055 0.034 -0.054  
Education -0.03*** 0.008 -0.139  
Income Quintiles -0.005 0.018 -0.011 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .437c 0.191 0.181 0.45454   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
CAMBODIA 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 0.857 0.133    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.205*** 0.018 0.297 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.046* 0.021 0.057 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.215*** 0.018 0.305  
Social Trust Dummy 0.047 0.04 0.029  
Organizational Membership -0.004 0.036 -0.002  
Traditionalism Index 0.207*** 0.034 0.154  
Female 0.112*** 0.028 0.101 
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Education -0.016* 0.006 -0.068  
Income Quintiles -0.028* 0.013 -0.055 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .562c 0.316 0.31 0.45694   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
MALAYSIA 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 0.99 0.118    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.191*** 0.017 0.302 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.078*** 0.02 0.102 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.192*** 0.018 0.266  
Social Trust Dummy 0.164** 0.049 0.079  
Organizational Membership 0.044 0.031 0.034  
Traditionalism Index 0.237*** 0.029 0.195  
Female -0.002 0.027 -0.001  
Education -0.023** 0.007 -0.087  
Income Quintiles -0.049*** 0.013 -0.102 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .628c 0.394 0.389 0.4507   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
MYANMAR 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 0.798 0.156    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.101*** 0.023 0.119 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.042 0.028 0.041 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.307*** 0.02 0.408  
Social Trust Dummy 0.163*** 0.043 0.096  
Organizational Membership 0.137*** 0.035 0.099  
Traditionalism Index 0.14*** 0.036 0.1  
Female 0.012 0.033 0.009  
Education -0.028*** 0.007 -0.107  
Income Quintiles -0.012 0.02 -0.016 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
3 .539c 0.291 0.285 0.5501   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
Appendix 2.1: General Institutional Trust Country-Level Regression Models 
JAPAN 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.081 0.142    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.092*** 0.019 0.166 
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Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.084*** 0.021 0.137 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.167*** 0.021 0.27  
Social Trust Dummy 0.098** 0.032 0.098  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.052 0.035 0.048 
 
Female -0.101** 0.031 -0.107  
Traditionalism Index 0.146*** 0.038 0.129  
Education 0.01 0.01 0.036  
Income Quintiles 0.002 0.012 0.007  
Winner Dummy 0.14** 0.042 0.149  
Loser Dummy -0.052 0.043 -0.054 
Model Summary 
   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate  
1 .558a 0.311 0.3 0.39229   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
KOREA 
    
  
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model 
 
B Std. Error Beta  
(Constant) 1.029 0.135 
 
1 National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.084*** 0.02 0.132 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.04 0.023 0.054 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.124*** 0.023 0.169  
Social Trust Dummy 0.142*** 0.031 0.14  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.119*** 0.03 0.121 
 
Female 0.022 0.029 0.023  
Traditionalism Index 0.194*** 0.031 0.191  
Education 0.007 0.01 0.026  
Income Quintiles -0.007 0.013 -0.019  
Winner Dummy 0.101* 0.041 0.103  
Loser Dummy -0.134** 0.043 -0.126 
Model Summary 
   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .488a 0.239 0.229 0.43085   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
MONGOLIA 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.434 0.14    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.14*** 0.019 0.229 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.067** 0.021 0.098 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.063** 0.018 0.105  
Social Trust Dummy 0.004 0.035 0.004  
Organizational Membership 0.102** 0.03 0.102 
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Female -0.011 0.028 -0.012  
Traditionalism Index 0.088** 0.031 0.085  
Education 0.003 0.006 0.013  
Income Quintiles -0.015 0.015 -0.034  
Winner Dummy 0.043 0.047 0.045  
Loser Dummy -0.037 0.051 -0.036 
Model Summary 
   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .344a 0.118 0.109 0.44979   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
PHILIPPINES 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.201 0.153    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.14*** 0.018 0.234 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.049* 0.02 0.073 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.102*** 0.019 0.154  
Social Trust Dummy 0.166** 0.056 0.084  
Organizational Membership 0.051 0.033 0.046  
Female 0.018 0.031 0.017  
Traditionalism Index 0.19*** 0.037 0.146  
Education -0.023** 0.007 -0.096  
Income Quintiles -0.045** 0.016 -0.089  
Winner Dummy 0.05 0.043 0.044  
Loser Dummy -0.08 0.053 -0.055 
Model Summary 
   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .432a 0.187 0.178 0.4936   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
TAIWAN 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 0.868 0.125    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.134 *** 0.013 0.268 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.06*** 0.016 0.102 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.156*** 0.016 0.247  
Social Trust Dummy 0.079** 0.025 0.081  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.089*** 0.024 0.09 
 
Female -0.018 0.024 -0.018  
Traditionalism Index 0.183*** 0.037 0.13  
Education -0.002 0.006 -0.011  
Income Quintiles -0.035** 0.011 -0.09  
Winner Dummy 0.056 0.034 0.057  
Loser Dummy -0.034 0.034 -0.033 
Model Summary 
   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .544a 0.296 0.289 0.41191 
88 
 
  
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
CAMBODIA 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 0.965 0.142    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.196*** 0.019 0.267 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.045* 0.022 0.054 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.2*** 0.019 0.27  
Social Trust Dummy 0.06 0.042 0.035  
Organizational Membership -0.026 0.038 -0.017  
Female 0.099** 0.029 0.085  
Traditionalism Index 0.204*** 0.035 0.145  
Education -0.009 0.007 -0.035  
Income Quintiles -0.047** 0.014 -0.087  
Winner Dummy 0.078* 0.036 0.067  
Loser Dummy -0.24*** 0.041 -0.181 
Model Summary 
   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .617a 0.381 0.374 0.46064   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
MALAYSIA 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.135 0.147    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.167*** 0.021 0.25 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.09*** 0.024 0.109 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.195*** 0.023 0.258  
Social Trust Dummy 0.174** 0.059 0.078  
Organizational Membership 0.011 0.036 0.008  
Female -0.059 0.033 -0.049  
Traditionalism Index 0.194*** 0.035 0.153  
Education -0.022** 0.008 -0.082  
Income Quintiles -0.037* 0.015 -0.075  
Winner Dummy 0.172*** 0.042 0.138  
Loser Dummy -0.187** 0.054 -0.119 
Model Summary 
   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .687a 0.472 0.464 0.44227   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
MYANMAR 
   
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 0.988 0.18    
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.132*** 0.027 0.157 
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Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.042 0.032 0.041 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.275*** 0.023 0.366  
Social Trust Dummy 0.112* 0.05 0.065  
Organizational Membership 0.156*** 0.04 0.112  
Female 0.04 0.038 0.03  
Traditionalism Index 0.072 0.041 0.052  
Education -0.029*** 0.008 -0.109  
Income Quintiles -0.031 0.023 -0.04  
Winner Dummy 0.081 0.047 0.058  
Loser Dummy -0.029 0.046 -0.021 
Model Summary 
   
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .520a 0.271 0.262 0.56092   
*** p <.001, ** p <. 01, * p < .05 
 
Appendix 2.2: Partisan Institutional Trust Country-Level Regression Models 
JAPAN 
     
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 0.722 0.172   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.127 0.023 0.188 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.1 0.026 0.134 0 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.181 0.025 0.241 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.091 0.039 0.075 0.021  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.023 0.042 0.017 0.59 
 
Female -0.138 0.037 -0.12 0  
Traditionalism Index 0.182 0.046 0.132 0  
Education -0.002 0.012 -0.006 0.877  
Income Quintiles -0.025 0.015 -0.063 0.088  
Winner Dummy 0.185 0.051 0.16 0  
Loser Dummy -0.126 0.052 -0.106 0.015 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .568a 0.322 0.311 0.47544 
 
 
KOREA 
     
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 0.812 0.159   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.114 0.024 0.149 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.032 0.028 0.036 0.244 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.157 0.027 0.178 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.166 0.037 0.136 0 
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Organizational 
Membership 
0.1 0.035 0.084 0.005 
 
Female 0.019 0.035 0.016 0.579  
Traditionalism Index 0.195 0.036 0.161 0  
Education -0.016 0.012 -0.046 0.175  
Income Quintiles 0.009 0.015 0.019 0.556  
Winner Dummy 0.156 0.049 0.133 0.001  
Loser Dummy -0.192 0.051 -0.15 0 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .514a 0.265 0.256 0.50725 
 
 
MONGOLIA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 1.031 0.182   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.189 0.024 0.235 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.081 0.027 0.091 0.003 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.094 0.023 0.12 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.037 0.045 0.024 0.419  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.158 0.039 0.12 0 
 
Female 0.015 0.037 0.012 0.69  
Traditionalism Index 0.045 0.04 0.033 0.269  
Education -0.001 0.008 -0.003 0.922  
Income Quintiles -0.015 0.02 -0.026 0.434  
Winner Dummy 0.223 0.061 0.174 0  
Loser Dummy 0.027 0.066 0.02 0.682 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .386a 0.149 0.14 0.5817 
 
 
PHILIPPINES 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 0.991 0.173   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.184 0.021 0.272 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.032 0.022 0.042 0.155 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.113 0.021 0.151 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.12 0.064 0.054 0.061  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.054 0.037 0.043 0.143 
 
Female 0.021 0.035 0.018 0.544 
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Traditionalism Index 0.184 0.042 0.125 0  
Education -0.018 0.008 -0.067 0.032  
Income Quintiles -0.036 0.018 -0.062 0.047  
Winner Dummy 0.042 0.048 0.033 0.381  
Loser Dummy -0.156 0.06 -0.096 0.01 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .430a 0.185 0.176 0.55658 
 
 
TAIWAN 
     
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 0.684 0.145   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.161 0.015 0.283 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.048 0.019 0.072 0.01 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.158 0.019 0.219 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.048 0.029 0.043 0.106  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.052 0.028 0.046 0.065 
 
Female -0.008 0.028 -0.007 0.772  
Traditionalism Index 0.186 0.043 0.116 0  
Education -0.009 0.007 -0.035 0.237  
Income Quintiles -0.029 0.013 -0.066 0.023  
Winner Dummy 0.095 0.039 0.085 0.015  
Loser Dummy -0.076 0.039 -0.066 0.054 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .527a 0.278 0.271 0.4757 
 
 
CAMBODIA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 0.813 0.172   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.248 0.023 0.286 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.032 0.027 0.032 0.226 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.215 0.023 0.246 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.027 0.05 0.013 0.588  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.02 0.046 0.011 0.658 
 
Female 0.096 0.036 0.07 0.007  
Traditionalism Index 0.177 0.042 0.106 0  
Education -0.005 0.008 -0.016 0.567  
Income Quintiles -0.042 0.017 -0.066 0.014 
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Winner Dummy 0.114 0.044 0.083 0.01  
Loser Dummy -0.27 0.05 -0.172 0 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .589a 0.347 0.34 0.55713 
 
 
MALAYSIA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 0.797 0.177   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.224 0.025 0.284 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.082 0.029 0.084 0.004 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.191 0.027 0.215 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.233 0.072 0.088 0.001  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.032 0.043 0.02 0.467 
 
Female -0.041 0.039 -0.029 0.3  
Traditionalism Index 0.209 0.042 0.14 0  
Education -0.016 0.01 -0.051 0.097  
Income Quintiles -0.036 0.018 -0.062 0.045  
Winner Dummy 0.262 0.051 0.178 0  
Loser Dummy -0.192 0.065 -0.103 0.003 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .669a 0.448 0.44 0.53376 
 
 
MYANMAR 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 0.885 0.198   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.144 0.029 0.161 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.038 0.035 0.036 0.269 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.267 0.025 0.338 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.121 0.055 0.066 0.028  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.157 0.044 0.106 0 
 
Female 0.039 0.042 0.028 0.344  
Traditionalism Index 0.137 0.045 0.093 0.003  
Education -0.024 0.009 -0.085 0.008  
Income Quintiles -0.008 0.025 -0.01 0.742  
Winner Dummy 0.065 0.052 0.044 0.209  
Loser Dummy -0.055 0.05 -0.037 0.277 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .502a 0.252 0.242 0.60207 
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Appendix 2.3: Neutral Institutional Trust Country-Level Regression Models 
JAPAN 
     
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 1.301 0.159   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.076 0.021 0.13 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.075 0.024 0.117 0.002 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.157 0.023 0.241 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.099 0.036 0.094 0.007  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.082 0.039 0.072 0.037 
 
Female -0.074 0.035 -0.074 0.034  
Traditionalism Index 0.126 0.042 0.105 0.003  
Education 0.016 0.011 0.055 0.151  
Income Quintiles 0.016 0.014 0.045 0.249  
Winner Dummy 0.096 0.047 0.097 0.043  
Loser Dummy -0.017 0.048 -0.017 0.722 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .463a 0.215 0.202 0.44057 
 
 
KOREA 
     
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 1.155 0.151   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.067 0.023 0.098 0.003 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.044 0.026 0.056 0.095 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.104 0.025 0.133 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.129 0.035 0.119 0  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.131 0.034 0.125 0 
 
Female 0.026 0.033 0.025 0.43  
Traditionalism Index 0.192 0.034 0.178 0  
Education 0.022 0.011 0.071 0.047  
Income Quintiles -0.017 0.014 -0.042 0.234  
Winner Dummy 0.071 0.046 0.068 0.126  
Loser Dummy -0.098 0.049 -0.086 0.044 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .401a 0.16 0.15 0.48116 
 
 
MONGOLIA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 1.681 0.153   0 
94 
 
 
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.11 0.02 0.171 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.057 0.023 0.079 0.013 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.043 0.02 0.068 0.029  
Social Trust Dummy -0.018 0.038 -0.015 0.635  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.07 0.033 0.066 0.033 
 
Female -0.028 0.031 -0.028 0.359  
Traditionalism Index 0.119 0.034 0.108 0.001  
Education 0.003 0.007 0.015 0.66  
Income Quintiles -0.013 0.017 -0.028 0.416  
Winner Dummy -0.068 0.052 -0.066 0.19  
Loser Dummy -0.081 0.055 -0.073 0.144 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .262a 0.068 0.058 0.489 
 
 
PHILIPPINES 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 1.319 0.173   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.116 0.021 0.177 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.059 0.022 0.081 0.008 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.094 0.021 0.128 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.196 0.064 0.091 0.002  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.05 0.037 0.041 0.172 
 
Female 0.016 0.035 0.013 0.66  
Traditionalism Index 0.196 0.042 0.137 0  
Education -0.026 0.008 -0.1 0.002  
Income Quintiles -0.049 0.018 -0.088 0.006  
Winner Dummy 0.057 0.048 0.045 0.236  
Loser Dummy -0.034 0.06 -0.022 0.571 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .374a 0.14 0.131 0.55615 
 
 
TAIWAN 
     
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 0.984 0.14   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.112 0.015 0.211 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.066 0.018 0.106 0 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.155 0.018 0.23 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.1 0.028 0.095 0  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.108 0.027 0.102 0 
 
Female -0.027 0.027 -0.025 0.319 
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Traditionalism Index 0.183 0.042 0.122 0  
Education 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.82  
Income Quintiles -0.038 0.012 -0.093 0.002  
Winner Dummy 0.044 0.037 0.041 0.245  
Loser Dummy 0.001 0.038 0.001 0.988 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .481a 0.231 0.224 0.46051 
 
 
CAMBODIA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 1.041 0.152   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.17 0.021 0.227 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.055 0.023 0.064 0.018 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.189 0.021 0.249 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.078 0.044 0.045 0.078  
Organizational 
Membership 
-0.053 0.04 -0.034 0.191 
 
Female 0.102 0.032 0.086 0.001  
Traditionalism Index 0.217 0.037 0.151 0  
Education -0.01 0.007 -0.038 0.175  
Income Quintiles -0.048 0.015 -0.087 0.001  
Winner Dummy 0.058 0.039 0.049 0.137  
Loser Dummy -0.231 0.044 -0.17 0 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .567a 0.321 0.314 0.49273 
 
 
MALAYSIA 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 1.336 0.158   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.134 0.022 0.199 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.096 0.026 0.115 0 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.195 0.024 0.258 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.14 0.064 0.063 0.028  
Organizational 
Membership 
-0.001 0.039 -0.001 0.981 
 
Female -0.07 0.035 -0.057 0.047  
Traditionalism Index 0.185 0.037 0.146 0  
Education -0.025 0.009 -0.095 0.003  
Income Quintiles -0.037 0.016 -0.075 0.021  
Winner Dummy 0.118 0.045 0.094 0.01  
Loser Dummy -0.188 0.058 -0.119 0.001 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .628a 0.395 0.386 0.47529 
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MYANMAR 
    
Model 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Sig.   
B Std. Error Beta 
 
1 (Constant) 1.051 0.194   0  
National Economic 
Evaluations 
0.134 0.029 0.15 0 
 
Family Economic 
Evaluations 
0.043 0.034 0.04 0.209 
 
Anti-Corruption Efforts 0.277 0.025 0.348 0  
Social Trust Dummy 0.096 0.054 0.053 0.078  
Organizational 
Membership 
0.158 0.044 0.107 0 
 
Female 0.044 0.041 0.032 0.283  
Traditionalism Index 0.035 0.045 0.024 0.433  
Education -0.033 0.009 -0.117 0  
Income Quintiles -0.048 0.025 -0.059 0.058  
Winner Dummy 0.08 0.051 0.054 0.119  
Loser Dummy -0.035 0.049 -0.024 0.473 
Model Summary 
    
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .492a 0.242 0.233 0.60557 
 
 
 
